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The New Law of Murder
DANIEL GIVELBER
[The loose term "malice" was used, and then when a particular state of
mind came under their notice the Judges called it "malice" or not
according to their view of the propriety of hanging particular people. That
is, in two words, the history of the definition of murder.'
There is today a new law of murder. Embedded in the menu of aggravating
circumstances characteristic of contemporary capital punishment statutes, the
new law performs the traditional function of murder law by separating those
killers whom the state may execute from those whom it may not.2 Over time,
the law of murder has changed to reflect shifts in sentiment as to which
killers most deserve capital punishment? The new law, developed over the
past twenty years, represents the most dramatic reworking of these sentiments
since the Pennsylvania legislature first divided the crime of murder into
degrees in 1794.4 In order to retain capital punishment,' thirty-six states have
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1. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1866, at Q.2110
[hereinafter 1866 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE] (statement of Sir James F. Stephen), quoted in ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 1953, cmt. 8932 at 28 [hereinafter ROYAL COMM'N].
2. See ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 1, at 381; Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale
ofthe Law of Homicide I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 702 (1937).
3. See 1866 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 1.
4. See Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U.
PA. L. REV. 759 (1949). Between 1794 and 1972, another significant development in the law of murder
evolved which did not involve the delineation of which killings and killers are most depraved: the shift
from mandatory to discretionary death sentencing. Introduced by Tennessee in the middle of the
nineteenth century, discretionary death sentencing was the virtually universal approach as of the time
of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). MODEL PENAL
CODE § 201.6 commentary at 66, (Tentative Draft No. 9) (Am. L. Inst. 1959) [hereinafter Tent. Draft
No. 9]; see John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment, and the Substantive Criminal
Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 143, 148-54 (1986)
[hereinafter Poulos, The Supreme Court].
5. In 1972, the Supreme Court held that the Georgia murder law then authorizing the imposition
of capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Four years later it held that a revised Georgia law calling for somewhat
controlled discretion satisfied the Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153. The Court also
upheld the Texas and Florida revisions on similar grounds, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), while rejecting the mandatory approach of Louisiana and North
Carolina, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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created the new crime of aggravated murder; these new rules apply to 78% of
the population and to 79% of the homicides that occur in this country.6
The new laws purport to solve the problem of the arbitrary and capricious
application of the death penalty which the Supreme Court believed plagued
the pre-1972 practice. The laws undertake a task authoritatively viewed in
1971 as "beyond present human ability."7 While the details of the new
approach vary from state to state, all of the new laws employ at least two
innovations: (a) through the mechanism of aggravated murder or aggravating
circumstances, they limit eligibility for capital punishment to a subset of those
covered by the traditional law; and (b) they require the discretionary decision
as to life or death to be made at a trial separate from that which determined
guilt or innocence.8 This approach incorporates the two major reforms of the
last 200 years-dividing murder into degrees and making the decision to
6. For the year 1991, 19,555 out of 24,703, or 79.1% of all murders and non-negligent
manslaughters occurred in the 37 states embracing capital punishment as of the end of 1992. These
states had a combined population of about 197,104,000 out of a total United States population of about
252,251,000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
STATISTICS 1992, tbl. 3.124 [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS]. The states that authorize
capital punishment are: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40 to -59 (1982 & Supp. 1993); Arizona, ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-601 to -605 (Michie 1987 &
Supp. 1991); California, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1993); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-46a to -46c (West
1985 & Supp. 1993); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1992); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141-.142 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -44
(Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Indiana, IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1992); Kentucky, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 532.025-.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Louisiana, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
905.3-.9 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412414 (1992 & Supp.
1993); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-101 to -107 (Supp. 1993); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 565.030-.035 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to -310 (1993);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2522 to -2523 (1989); Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.030-
.035 (Michie 1992); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1992); New Jersey, NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (West Supp. 1993); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (Michie
1990 & Supp. 1993); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000 to -2002 (1990 & Supp. 1993);
Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-.06 (Anderson 1993); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. lit. 21,
§§ 701.9-.13 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp. 1992);
Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1982 & Supp. 1993); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1992); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
23A-27A-1 to 41 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-202 to -206 (1991 &
Supp. 1992); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1993); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-3-206 to -207 (1990); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7101-7107, (1974); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2 to -264.5 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.95.020-.150 (West 1990); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-102 to -103 (Michie
Supp. 1993). Of these, all but Vermont employ the concept of aggravated murder.
7. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) ("To identify before the fact those
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.').
8. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246
(1988), summarized the Eighth Amendment requirements as follows: "There is no question but that the
Louisiana scheme narrows the class of death-eligible murderers and then at the sentencing phase allows
for the consideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of discretion. The Constitution
requires no more."
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impose death discretionary? However, it recasts the criteria for the most
serious degree of murder and alters the circumstances under which the
discretionary decision is made. This Article focuses on the first of these
changes, the articulation of a new, substantive law of murder.1"
The new law of aggravated murder can be broadly summarized as follows:
One who intentionally, knowingly, or with gross recklessness kills another is
guilty of capital murder (and thus may be executed) if (a) the defendant has
been convicted of murder previously; (b) the defendant killed to secure
financial gain; (c) the defendant killed in the course of the commission of a
felony; (d) the defendant either killed in a protracted manner or tortured the
victim; or (e) the defendant killed a police officer or correctional official."
This approach rejects five centuries of emphasis on the defendant's state of
mind as a key determinant of death eligibility. 2 However flawed the
premeditation and deliberation formula might have been in application, it
reflected the premise that culpability was related to choice in the sense that
an unprovoked, conscious, and deliberate decision to take the life of another
was the paradigm of the capital murderer. The new capital murder rules make
no such claim. In the ostensible service of reducing arbitrariness (if not
achieving rationality) 3 when imposing the death penalty, the search has
turned from the killer's state of mind to "objective," external aggravating
facts.
9. The commentary to the Model Penal Code asserted, "[glrading and discretion, then, have been
the means pervasively employed in the United States to limit the use of capital punishment for
homicides that would be murder at common law." Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 66. These are still
the means used to limit the use of capital punishment. What has changed are the criteria for grading,
and the mechanisms for exercising discretion.
10. Although there have been 20 years of'judicial and legislative efforts to craft a new set of rules
for murder, relatively little attention has focused on just what those rules are and how they relate to the
more general goals of the substantive criminal law. There are notable exceptions. See, e.g., Bruce S.
Ledewitz, The New Role of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in American Death Penalty Law, 22
DUQ. L. REv. 317, 369-96 (1984); John W. Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 646-47 (1990)
[hereinafter Poulos, Liability Rules]; Poulos, The Supreme Court, supra note 4; Richard A. Rosen,
Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1103 (1990)
[hereinafter Rosen, Felony Murder]; Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating
Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1986) [hereinafter
Rosen, The Standardless Standard]; see also, Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender
Discrimination, 25 LAW & Soc'y Rav. 367 (1991) (combining substantive and empirical analysis of
capital punishment as it relates to gender).
11. This is the Model Penal Code definition of murder. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Am. Law
Inst. 1980). In a number of states, an accidental killing will suffice, as long as it occurs during the
commission of a felony. Under Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Supreme Court appears to
require at least "reckless indifference" or "reckless disregard," both of which, are consistent with an
accident. Id. at 157-58.
12. ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 1, at 25-28.
13. The relevant sections of the Model Penal Code were presented in draft form in 1959 and
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1962. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 210. They were designed to
eliminate problems-including arbitrariness and inequality-that flowed from the traditional approach
of dividing murder into degrees and giving the jury unfettered discretion. See id. art. 210 commentary
at 1-3. The Model Penal Code does not mention constitutional concerns, nor could it have. The Institute
would have needed unparalleled prescience to have anticipated, in 1959, the decisions in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
1994]
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To a surprising degree, death may be imposed based on the identity of the
victim, the method of killing, and the prior record of the killer. Shooting and
killing during a robbery at a 7-Eleven can result in the death penalty, as can
a frenzied effort to end life with a knife or heavy instrument; the calculated
killing of one's spouse, if done efficiently, 4 cannot." While felony
murderers remain as likely to receive death sentences under the new law as
under the old, efficient domestic killers are now generally exempt. Additional-
ly, in more than half of the states that sanction capital punishment, 6 frenzied
killers who might have been exempt under the old formula 7 are now eligible
for death.
The new law is a failure. By most measures, it has marginally reduced but
by no means eliminated arbitrariness from capital punishment. It has
exacerbated rather than ameliorated the role race plays in capital punishment
decisions. Doctrinally, it introduces an element of strict liability into what
should be the most refined judgment society makes about a person's mental
processes. The new law represents a triumph for the objectivity and moral
obtuseness of the felony murder principle as the model for how society should
go about selecting those who die. Writ large, the new law of murder reflects
an approach to criminal responsibility that lacks any self-limiting principle.
The shift from mens rea to aggravating factors represents a fundamental
change in the purpose of the law of capital murder. Stated most broadly,
society has abandoned the goal of controlling specific criminal behavior
through the use of the death penalty. Its new goal seems to be to execute
those whose conduct appears most frightening to the reasonable person. The
focus has shifted from the state of mind of the defendant to the state of mind
of the sentencer. Whether the new approach is characterized as utilitarian or
14. As a matter of law, an efficient killing cannot, in many states, be particularly "heinous" or
"atrocious" because the victim did not suffer consciously before expiring. See, e.g., Stouffer v. State,
742 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988) (interpreting the "heinousness"
provision of the Oklahoma law to require torture or serious physical abuse in the course of the murder
in order to meet Eighth Amendment narrowing concerns). Most lists of aggravating circumstances
provide no other basis for including a domestic killing. Interestingly, the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment criticized the forerunner of the "aggravated circumstances" model, the Home Secretary's
1948 proposed revision of the murder statute, for precisely this omission:
The distinction between capital and non-capital murders was not founded on any rational
principle and would lead to many anomalies and inconsistencies. Many of the most heinous
crimes, such as cruel and deliberate murder by a husband of his wife, or political assassination,
would not be punishable with death, while less odious offences would still be capital.
ROYAL COMM'N, supra note I, at 171.
15. Rapaport, supra note 10, at 369, 377-78.
16. See Rosen, The Standardless Standard, supra note 10, at 943 (listing 24 such states but
including California, whose Supreme Court rejected the circumstance as unconstitutionally vague. People
v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 76, 81 (Cal. 1982)).
17. People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968), involving the murder of a child by repeated
stabbing, typifies this kind of case. The California Supreme Court rejected the first-degree murder
conviction and death sentence because it found that, in the absence of proof of the defendant's motive,
actions before the killing, or acts that were reasonably calculated to kill, there was insufficient evidence
to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Id. While the California Supreme Court might
still interpret its statute in this manner today (People v. Bloyd, 729 P.2d 802 (Cal. 1987), indicates that
the court still struggles with Anderson), in most states this kind of killing is the classic murder reached
by the heinousness provision.
[Vol. 69:375
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"moral" is well beside the point; the current approach represents a dramatic
and unnecessary concession that the business of criminal law is to process
criminals rather than control crime. Even if it is uncertain whether gradations
in punishment are effective in controlling particular forms of antisocial
behavior, those who craft the law should not surrender the principle that
humans are rational and will respond rationally. To do so leaves society
without any limiting principle on the definition of crime or the sanctions that
should accompany it.
Part I of this Article explores the contemporary roots of the new law of
murder by briefly tracing the parallel efforts of the American Law Institute
and Great Britain's Royal Commission on Capital Punishment to rewrite the
law of murder in order to control discretion. While the Royal Commission's
recommendations did not become law, the Model Penal Code received the
endorsement of the Supreme Court 8 and became the model for the new law
of capital murder. The discussion focuses on aggravated murder as substantive
law and the consequences of choosing felony murder as opposed to premedita-
tion and deliberation as the model for the new law of murder.
Part II briefly recounts the process by which an approach that claimed the
parentage of the Model Penal Code became the model for a constitutionally
adequate capital punishment statute. To demonstrate how this new model
functions and to expose some of its contradictions, this Article considers its
application to the facts of the crimes in McGautha v. California,9 (and its
companion case, Crampton v. Ohio),20 Furman v. Georgia,21 and Fisher v.
United States.
22
Part III examines the new law empirically and doctrinally. The problems
that troubled the Court in Furman have not been cured and some problems
may have been exacerbated. The new rules reflect a hopelessness about the
ability of our most severe sanction to control crime and a distrust of the
ability of sentencers to make sophisticated moral judgments. They replace
choice with bad effects as the underlying principle of the criminal justice
system. The rules, on paper and in practice, confirm Justice Harlan's
skepticism about our capacity to fashion rules that will make us comfortable
about the fairness and equality with which capital punishment is imposed. The
demands of fairness and equality continue to point to the abolition, not the
reworking, of capital punishment.
I. SOURCES OF THE NEW LAW OF MURDER
Until the beginning of the 1970's, the law of murder in this country dealt
with capital punishment in two steps. First, the crime of murder was divided
into degrees, and capital punishment was reserved solely for those guilty of
18. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976).
19. McGautha, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
20. Id.
21. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. Fisher, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
first-degree murder. Second, juries had discretion as to whether to sentence
a defendant guilty of first-degree murder to death. The jury made this decision
in the same proceeding and at the same time as it determined guilt. This
system, referred to as "grading and discretion," had its critics, and in 1959 the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code Project proposed what appeared
to be a very different model for imposing capital punishment. That model
provided some of the structure and most of the legitimacy for the capital
statutes that the Supreme Court ultimately approved. To understand the new
law, it is important to understand what was thought to be wrong with the law
of murder and how the Model Penal Code proposed to cure these difficulties.
A.- The Rejection of the Division of Murder into Degrees
The traditional law of murder employed two tests to distinguish between
those who could be executed (first-degree murderers) and those who could
not: the existence of premeditation and deliberation, and the doctrine of felony
murder.23 Pennsylvania began the practice at the end of the eighteenth
century in order to ameliorate the harshness of the law and limit capital
punishment. Its statute was both seminal and typical:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing,
or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be
murder in the first degree. All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the
second degree .... Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the
first degree is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to suffer death in
the manner provided by law, or to undergo imprisonment for life, at the
discretion of the jury trying the case, which shall fix the penalty by its
verdict.24
As of 1959,-thirty-four states employed a murder statute modeled on or
closely resembling the Pennsylvania formula.25 Forty-one of the forty-three
states embracing capital punishment in 1959 provided for discretionary rather
than mandatory death sentences.26 A death sentence was carried out in a
"trivial fraction" of the cases in which it could have been imposed.27
Nonetheless, in an apparent effort to make capital punishment more consistent
and less unequal,28 the Model Penal Code rejected the then contemporary
approach to capital punishment in favor of an approach that gave the jury
guidance by employing the behavioral model of criminality typical of felony
murder. This decision had important implications for the new law of murder
23. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 27. For a discussion and comparison of the doctrines in
terms of their contribution to an identification of the most evil offenders, see Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil
and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 437 (1990).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4701 (1945), reprinted in Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 99.
25. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 66.
26. See id. at 63, 66.
27. Id. at 63.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 and commentary at 114-17.
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in terms of the nature of the evidence necessary for a conviction of capital
murder, the moral basis for distinguishing between capital and other murders,
and the paradigmatic perpetrator-victim mix.
1. Premeditation vs. Felony Murder as a Basis for
Identifying the Death Eligible:
Evidentiary Concerns
The premeditation and deliberation formula, the critics suggested, did not
adequately identify the most serious murders because it did not provide the
sentencer with any meaningful way to distinguish between murders. Most
courts did not require the passage of any appreciable time before the killing
in order for the jury to find that the defendant had deliberated.2 9 In these
states a jury that found that the defendant intentionally killed the victim could,
from that factual finding alone, arrive at a verdict of first-degree murder.30
Suppose that the evidence demonstrated that the defendant saw the victim
on the street, drew a knife, and attacked the victim, killing him. The
defendant did not take the stand, and his conduct remained unexplained. In
these circumstances, the defendant could be found guilty of first-degree
murder under the premeditation formula. The jury would have to draw but two
inferences. The first is that people intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of their actions: Because the defendant struck the victim with a
deadly weapon, the jury may infer that he intended to kill. The second
inference is that because a moment passed between his reaching for his knife
and his striking the victim, he had the opportunity to premeditate and, in fact,
did so."
Thus the premeditation and deliberation formula resulted in giving the jury
unguided discretion to return first-degree murder. Critics such as Justice
Cardozo objected to giving the jury this discretion under "a cloud of
mystifying words" such as "premeditation," "deliberation," and "malice
aforethought" rather than directly.32 After all, a jury might not understand
29. E.g., Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76 N.E. 127, 141 (Mass. 1905) (quoted in Tent. Draft No. 9,
supra note 4, at 69) ("It is not so much a matter of time as of logical sequence. First, the deliberation
and premeditation, then the resolution to kill, and lastly the killing in pursuance of the resolution; and
all this may occur within a few seconds."); accord, Sandoval v. People, 192 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1948);
People v. Donnelly, 210 P. 523 (Cal. 1922); see Pillsbury, supra note 23, at 453-54.
30. See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 222-23 (N.J. 1987) (noting that under the
premeditation and deliberation standard, only a "rare" murder did not support either first-degree or
second-degree murder).
31. "It matters not how short the interval [between the determination to kill and the infliction of
the mortal wound], if the time was sufficient for one thought to follow another .... " Sandoval, 192
P.2d at 424-25.
32. Benjamirr N. Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, Address Before the New York
Academy of Medicine (Nov. 1, 1928), in LAW AND LITERATURE 70, 100-01 (1931).
If intent is deliberate and premeditated whenever there is choice, then in truth it is always
deliberate and premeditated, since choice is involved in the hypothesis of the intent. What we
have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the suddenness of
the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of mercy.
I have no objection to giving them this dispensing power, but it should be given to them
1994]
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that it had been given discretion to choose between life and death and instead
tender its verdict based upon an effort to comprehend and apply the
premeditation formula.
A first-degree felony murder conviction requires evidence of something
more than a killing, namely evidence of a separate crime. Felony murder,
then, provides a factor beyond the killing which differentiates it from all other
murders. A jury that found as a fact that defendant's act caused the victim's
death could not, from that fact alone, draw the inferences that would permit
it to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder under a felony murder
theory. To the extent that the problem with capital punishment was the
unlimited ability of the prosecutor to charge and the jury to convict any
intentional killer of capital murder, felony murder provided an approach to
solving the problem.33 Whether it was a good approach depended on whether
a felony circumstance or comparable objective aggravating factors did a good
job of identifying those who should die..
2. Premeditation vs. Felony Murder as a Basis for
Identifying the Death Eligible:
Moral Blameworthiness
Even if courts required evidence of actual premeditation and deliberation,34
critics objected that the presence of premeditation did not necessarily signal
that the defendant was in the class of the most morally blameworthy killers
while its absence did not necessarily mean that the defendant was not in that
class. As the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment put it, the premedita-
tion and deliberation formula was "too wide and too narrow."" Premedita-
tion and deliberation treated the premeditated murderer as more depraved than
one who killed on impulse. This moral ordering made the greatest amount of
sense if one assumed that those who kill impulsively do so because they are
in some comprehensible way provoked or upset. Such killers have traditional-
ly been treated as less morally culpable than the unprovoked, premeditated
killer.36 However, there is a third category of intentional killers: those who
directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words.... Upon the basis of this fine distinction with
its obscure and mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to their death.
Id.
33. This is not much of an achievement. If the only goal is to narrow the class of those who are
eligible for death, then a variety of approaches would suffice, including killing only those whose names
began with the letter "A." Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 353. "Such a statutory aggravating circumstance
[a last name beginning with the letter "A"] would narrow the class, but to no coherent purpose. One can
judge whether a statutory aggravating circumstance narrows enough only by understanding what
substantive limits there are, if any, on which members of the.., pool may be considered for the death
penalty." Id.
34. People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968), is a leading example of this approach. The court
identified three categories of evidence as relevant to the question of whether the defendant premeditated:
(a) evidence of planning activities; (b) the existence of a prior relationship from which a motive can be
inferred; and (c) the manner of the killing. Id. at 949.
35. ROYAL COMM'N, supra note I, at 175.
36. One could also suggest that such killers are less likely to be deterred than the premeditated
murderer. See Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 63. However, just because a killer may have been
[Vol. 69:375
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kill impulsively for no comprehensible reason. These people may be even
more cruel, dangerous, and depraved than the premeditated killer who plans
the crime in advance.37
Given this landscape of murderers, premeditation and deliberation does not
appear to serve a useful function. If the law provides a broad definition of the
provocation that reduces murder to manslaughter and gives full play to the
defenses of diminished capacity and diminished responsibility (as does the
Model Penal Code),38 the premeditation and deliberation formula is not
needed to save the provoked killer from possible execution. Such a killer will
not be guilty of murder at all. This leaves the premeditated killer and the
unprovoked impulsive killer, and there is no reason to believe that one who
plans to kill is more deserving of capital punishment than one who kills on
impulse. Indeed, the very act of considering whether to kill might suggest that
the decision to take life was uncharacteristic or might suggest that the killing
was undertaken with good motives, as in a mercy killing.39 Based on this
beyond the influence of the criminal law does not mean that the state's execution of that person will
not deter others who are subject to such influences. H.L.A. Hart, Murder and the Principles of
Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U. L. Rv. 433, 451 (1957).
37. As James F. Stephen wrote:
As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at least as dangerous
to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by sudden as by premeditated murders.
The following cases appear to me to set this in a clear light. A, passing along the road, sees
a boy sitting on a bridge over a deep river and, out of mere wanton barbarity, pushes him into
it and so drowns him. A man makes advances to a girl who repels him. He deliberately but
instantly cuts her throat. A man civilly asked to pay a just debt pretends to get the money,
loads a rifle and blows out his creditor's brains. In none of these cases is there premeditation
unless the word is used in a sense as unnatural as 'aforethought' in 'malice aforethought', but
each represents even more diabolical cruelty and ferocity than that which is involved in
murders premeditated in the natural sense of the word.
3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 94 (London, MacMillan 1883) cited in ROYAL
COMM'N, supra note 1, at 175.
This group can also be seen as beyond the deterrent effect of the criminal law. They are the ones who
commit "crimes of such depravity that the actor reveals himself as doubtfully within the reach of
influences that might be especially inhibitory in the case of an ordinary man." Tent. Draft No. 9, supra
note 4, at 63-64. Again, that the killer himself was beyond deterrence does not mean that executing such
a killer would not deter others.
38. The doctrine of diminished capacity relates to one's ability to have the requisite mens rea for
a given crime. Section 4.02(1) of the Model Penal Code permits the introduction of evidence of mental
disease or defect whenever it is relevant to whether the defendant did or did not possess the requisite
mens rea. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1). Section 4.02(2), along with 210.4(b) and (g), embrace the
doctrine of diminished responsibility which permits the jury to consider evidence of the effect of mental
disease, defect, or intoxication on the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
in determining whether to sentence the defendant to death. Id. §§ 4.02(2), 210.4(b), 210.4(g).
Section 210.3(b) propounds an expansive view of provocation. It defines as manslaughter:
[A] homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the-actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
Id. § 210.3(b).
39. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 70.
[A]n impulsive killing, resting on the slightest provocation, hardly presents a stronger case for
mitigation than a homicide committed after genuine internal struggle in response to a strong
provocation (in the largest sense of the extrinsic causes of homicide). The very fact of the
internal struggle may be evidence that the defendant's homicidal impulse was entirely
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reasoning, the Model Penal Code rejected premeditation and deliberation as
the basis for distinguishing the death eligible from other murderers. 40
At the aspirational level at least, the premeditation and deliberation formula
had important virtues. By providing the most extreme punishment for those
who deliberately chose to take life, it reinforced the fundamental principle that
those who set out to violate the interests of others are more deserving of
punishment than those who do so accidentally. 4' Second, premeditation and
deliberation focused the deterrent power of capital punishment on those who
had the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of their actions. The
conclusion that the criminal law might not influence the behavior of many
murderers provides no justification for failing to treat with maximum
seriousness those offenders who had an opportunity to reflect upon what they
were doing and chose to do it anyway. At its core, the premeditation and
deliberation formula represented an effort to serve both moral (retributive) and
utilitarian (deterrence) goals.
The felony-murder doctrine served neither goal as well as the premeditation
and deliberation formula. It had two doctrinal functions. First, killings which
occurred during the commission of specified felonies were treated as murder
even if the defendant lacked the mens rea required for murder. The commen-
tary to the original draft of the Model Penal Code noted that a principled
argument for using a felony to find "constructive malice" is hard to find. 2
This felony-murder doctrine broadens the range of acts that constitute murder
because it eliminates the need to establish that the killing would have been
murder in the absence of the accompanying felony.43 After first turning all
killings during a felony into "murder," felony murder performed its second
doctrinal function by elevating these "murders" into murders in the first
aberrational, far more the product of extraordinary circumstances than true reflection of the
actor's normal self.
ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1952, at 785 [hereinafter 1952
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE] (statement of Professor Herbert Wechsler), quoted in ROYAL COMM'N, supra
note 1, at 175.
40. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 68-70. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
(1949-1953) came to the same conclusion. The commission's task was to determine whether it was
possible to modify the English law of murder (which called for mandatory death) in light of the reality
that nearly half of those convicted of murder were spared through executive clemency. ROYAL COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 4-14. The commission rejected dividing murder into degrees through the premeditation
and deliberation formula. 1d. at 174-75. It proposed elimination of the felony-murder doctrine and an
expanded test for provocation that could reduce murder to manslaughter. Id. at 213-14.
41. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has noted:
Our system of criminal laws is predicated usually on the imposition of punishment based on
the defendant's intent. Indeed, our Code's ranking of crimes by degree places those crimes
committed with intentional conduct as the highest degree of crime, for which the defendant is
most severely punished. Society's concern, the community's concern, the Legislature's concern,
is to punish most harshly those who intend to inflict pain, harm and suffering-in addition to
intending death.
State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 230 (N.J. 1987) (emphasis in original).
42. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 37.
43. Samuel Pillsbury notes that the premeditation and deliberation formula focuses almost
exclusively on rationality, and that felony murder focuses almost exclusively on motive. He argues that
we need to focus on both. Pillsbury, supra note 23, at 439.
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degree. In essence, the mens rea necessary to establish the underlying felony
became the mens rea sufficient to establish that the killing was murder. Then,
the felony circumstance converted the murder into first-degree murder.
Because it eliminated any mens rea requirement beyond that for the
underlying felony, felony murder as "constructive malice" swept within its
reach accomplices who had no role in any killing and raised the possibility
that a co-defendant could be guilty of first-degree murder when an accomplice
died at the hands of the police. It turned accidental killings into first-degree
murder.44 In addition, felony murder eliminated provocation and self-defense
as ameliorating factors for non-accidental killings. The doctrine compounded
its blurring of moral lines with the lack of a coherent focus as a deterrent.
Because empirical data establishing that killings in general and accidental
killings in particular occurred frequently during the commission of felonies
was lacking, trying to stop such killings through the threat of capital
punishment appeared ineffective and excessive.45
In its second role, converting murder into first-degree murder, felony
murder operated like premeditation and deliberation. For those killings that
would not otherwise have been murder, this second step compounded the
moral obtuseness of felony murder. This aspect of the doctrine was less
objectionable for that small subset of cases involving a killing that was
murder during a felony (for example, not accidental, provoked, or in self-
defense) but which was not the product of premeditation and deliberation. In
such a case, the existence of a contemporaneous violent felony supplied the
missing element necessary to make the crime first-degree (capital) murder.
Principled arguments for treating these cases as first-degree murder may well
exist.46 In essence, the anti-social behavior reflected in the independent
felony served to distinguish the killing from, and to label it as worse than, the
ordinary murder. Whatever the argument, evidence suggested that juries gave
felonious circumstances considerable weight.47
44. "It [the traditional delineation of capital murder] is too broad.., insofar as felony-murder
includes unintentional homicides caused by conduct which creates small risk of fatal injury or which
are even truly accidental." Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 68.
45. The commentary to the Model Penal Code notes that then current studies of crime in
Philadelphia between 1948 and 1952 indicated that .5% of all robberies, .35% of all rapes, and .0036%
of all burglaries were accompanied by homicides. It also notes that death was imposed in one-seventh
of the cases involving homicide and robbery or rape. Id. at 38-39. Employing the penalty for first-degree
murder to control conduct that causes death this infrequently makes neither theoretical nor practical
sense, particularly because conduct that has a greater chance of causing death, such as driving recklessly
while intoxicated, does not receive felony murder treatment
An alternative formulation of the deterrence argument focuses not on controlling accidental killings,
but on preventing the underlying felony. Such an approach fails to emphasize features of the conduct
that the defendant can control-such as the use of a deadly weapon-in favor of features that she cannot
control. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 452 (1985).
46. See Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 11, 37 COLUM.
L. REV. 1261, 1271-72 (1937).
47. See MARvIN E. WOLFGANG, PATrERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 243 (Patterson Smith series in
Criminology, Law Enforcement, and Social Problems, Pub. No. 211, 1975). Wolfgang found that out
of 588 homicides committed in Philadelphia over a four-year period (1948-52), seven resulted in death
sentences. Juries imposed six of these seven death sentences in felony murder cases, which totaled 57.
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Despite these criticisms,4" the Model Penal Code retained felony murder
in its broad form and eliminated premeditation. Instead of permitting the mens
rea for the felony to suffice as the mens rea for murder, the Code required a
finding of at least gross homicidal recklessness to support a conviction for
murder. A defendant's participation in particular felonies gave rise to a
presumption of gross recklessness, which the defendant was free to contra-
dict.49 Thus, the Code inserted the step of requiring a finding of "gross
homicidal recklessness" between the finding that the defendant participated
in a felony and the finding that the defendant was guilty of murder. The Code
also embraced the second function of the felony-murder doctrine. A felony
circumstance converted an ordinary murder into capital murder. Indeed, the
objective and non-evaluative features of felony murder became the hallmark
of the new law of homicide.
3. Premeditation vs. Felony Murder as a Basis for
Selecting the Death Eligible:
Victims
One other distinction between an approach focusing on premeditation and
one focusing on felony murder requires mention. The two doctrines contem-
plate different victims. The notion of premeditation and deliberation, if taken
at all seriously, focuses attention on those killings in which the murderer has
thought about ending the victim's life before the act of taking that life.
Typically, this means that the defendant had a relationship with the victim
Id. at 243. The more than 500 remaining homicides apparently led to a single death sentence. Id. at 305.
48. The 1980 commentary, as opposed to the Code, carried forward the ringing critique of felony
murder, noting that there were even "graver' objections to it than to premeditation and deliberation.
"Punishing some instances of felony murder as a capital crime simply compounds the fundamental
illogic and unfairness of this rule of strict liability." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 128-29
(footnote omitted).
49. Section 210.2. Murder
(1) Except as provided in [the section dealing with manslaughter], criminal homicide
constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is
engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2. The provisions regarding felony murder have been characterized as a
"symbolic compromise" between political reality (the popularity of felony murder with prosecutors) and
the Code's "unified and coordinated doctrine of mens rea." Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins,
Murder, the Model Penal Code, and Multiple Agendas of Reform, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 773, 782-83 (1988).
The principal author of the Code admitted "a certain sense of concession to political necessity" in the
creation of a presumption but suggested that the presumption was also "principled" because the best
argument for felony murder is that the underlying felony involves a homicidal risk. While the
commentary does not clarify the point, the reasoning underlying the approach suggests that the
presumption would shift the burden of production to the defendant to demonstrate the lack of extreme
indifference to human life. Whether this makes much sense or represents an improvement over the
traditional formula might not be a critical point because only one state, New Hampshire, has adopted
this approach to felony murder.
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that preceded their fatal interaction and that the decision to take the victim's
life arose out of that relationship. The classic relationship that gives rise to
such feelings is an intimate one, and the classic victim is a spouse or a
lover.5
At the other extreme, to the extent that the killing was not anticipated, the
classic victim of a felony murder is the felony victim or a bystander. Whether
or not the killing was anticipated, the victims are likely to be strangers
because most felons would prefer to commit their crimes against people
unlikely to identify them. 1 Thus, the paradigmatic victim of a premeditated
killing is an intimate, and the paradigmatic victim of a felony murder is a
stranger.
B. The Rejection of Discretionary Sentencing
Discretionary sentencing, like the division of murder into degrees, came into
the law as a technique for limiting the practice of capital punishment. In this
country, the sentencer typically had complete discretion as to whether to
impose life imprisonment or death. 2 On its face, this approach seemed
humane and sound. 3 Indeed, just a few years before the Model Penal Code
Project sought to remedy the perceived deficiencies of unrestricted discretion,
a comparable group in Great Britain-The Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment ("Commission" or "Royal Commission")-recommended changing
the British system to give juries precisely such discretion. 4
Two factors help explain the difference between the recommendations of the
Royal Commission and the Model Penal Code ("Code"). First, unlike murder
in the United States, murder in Great Britain carried a mandatory death
50. Compare People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968) (identifying the importance of a
prior relationship and the motive it suggests for a finding of premeditation and reversing a first-degree
murder conviction when evidence of such a prior relationship is lacking) with People v. Cole, 301 P.2d
854, 858-59 (Cal. App. 1956) (upholding first-degree murder conviction where there is evidence of an
intimate relationship giving rise to a motive for wanting the victim dead).
51. A comprehensive study of homicides in Philadelphia published in 1958 provided stark evidence
of this point. Of the more than 500 homicides studied, the victim was a stranger in more than
three-fourths (42 out of 57) of the felony homicides. For all homicides (including felony murders), the
victim was a stranger in only one out of eight cases. NVOLFGANG, supra note 47, at 243.
52. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 66.
53. The commentary to the Model Penal Code was far more expansive regarding the problems of
discretion in its 1980 incarnation than in its original, 1959 form. The 1959 commentary focused its
energy on the defects of the premeditation/felony murder formula; jury discretion was seen as positive:
As jury discretion operates in the United States, it produces, as Thorsten Sellin has shown, a
relatively small proportion of capital convictions. Given the numbers of murders prosecuted
annually, this bespeaks widespread reluctance to impose capital punishment, which further
bespeaks a strict screening of the cases in which a sentence has been sought.
Id. at 73-74 (footnote omitted). The 1980 commentary, reflecting the Supreme Court decisions of the
preceding decade, noted that: discretion included the possibility of abuse and uninformed discretion
heightened that possibility; a lack of consistency in decisions may give rise to a claim of unfairness in
any given case; and a lack of predictability undercuts any possible deterrent impact. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 commentary at 132.
54. ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 1, at 214. In 1948, the British Government created the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, which met from 1949 to 1953, heard testimony from hundreds of
witnesses, reviewed thousands of pages of written materials and studies, and issued a 500-page report.
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sentence. Moreover, in England (but not in Scotland), if the evidence
supported a charge of murder the prosecutor had no discretion to charge a
different offense.55 Yet nearly half (45.7%) of all people sentenced to death
between 1900 and 1949 received executive commutation of their sentences. 6
The Commission's challenge was to see whether the law, as opposed to
executive discretion, could be the instrument that narrowed the application of
the death sentence to those who actually should die. It concluded that the
substantive law could not do so for two reasons. First, the elements which
determine whether death is appropriate can never be determined from the
criminal act alone.5 7 Second, there was no definition of murder that was not
"too wide and too narrow." Therefore, the Commission recommended giving
the jury the unfettered discretion to choose life imprisonment or death with
the Home Office58 retaining the power of executive clemency. 9
The second difference between the British situation and that confronting the
drafters of the Code involved the perceived results of discretionary decisions.
The Royal Commission concluded that the results of the British system were
"broadly satisfactory. Though opinions will inevitably differ about particular
cases, the final decision on the issue of life or death is generally felt to be
just and reasonable. 60 In England, there was centralized control over the
decision to prosecute and the decision to commute. Moreover, those in charge
of the decision to prosecute insisted that fact situations justifying a charge of
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id. at 174.
The crux of the matter is that any legal definition must be expressed in terms of the
objective characteristics of the offence, whereas the choice of the appropriate penalty must be
based on a much wider range of considerations, which cannot be defined but are essentially
a matter for the exercise of discretion.
Id. at 173. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); and
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) are the contemporary, constitutional manifestations
of this principle.
58. The Home Office is one of the Major Departments of English Government and is headed by
the Home Secretary. During the time period studied by the Royal Commission, its duties included,
among others, "[tihe supervision (other than judicial) of the administration ofjustice, advice to the King
upon the exercise of the perogative of mercy, [and] the supervision of police, prisons and reformatories
." 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 572 (1947).
59. ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 1, at 213-14. The Commission suggested (a) that the doctrine of
constructive malice (felony murder) be eliminated; (b) that the jury be permitted to return a
manslaughter verdict in a case where a reasonable person would be provoked, even if by words alone;
(c) that "aiding and abetting suicide" should be a substantive crime other than murder, (d) that the
M'Naghten test be expanded to take account of mental illness which affected behavioral controls; (e)
that people under 21 at the time of the crime not be eligible for execution; and (f) that the jury be given
the discretion to choose between life and death in any murder case. Id.
The Commission rejected any notion that the crime of murder be divided into degrees with the death
penalty reserved for first-degree murders only. Id.
60. Id. at 213. Not all would agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 36, at 460 n.50
(1957) (identifying as important to the movement toward abolition the execution of Timothy Evans and
the subsequent disclosure by the then Home Secretary that he erred in denying a reprieve because he
later came to believe that Evans was innocent); Sidney Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New
Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. RV. 624, 631 n.40 (1957) (referring to the cases
of Ruth Ellis and Derek Bentley as particularly troubling examples of the execution of those not
considered the most serious of killers).
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murder led to just such a charge. In any event, the Royal Commission's
recommendations were not followed; instead Parliament adopted a stop gap
measure employing the notion of aggravated murder.61 Capital punishment
was finally eliminated in England in 1970.62,
C. The Code Approach
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, reflecting upon the American
experience with discretionary sentencing, saw arbitrariness and inequality
permeating the institution of capital punishment.63 The drafters found a lack
of evidence that the death penalty prevented murder, and they found that
capital punishment has a "discernible and baneful effect upon the administra-
tion of justice" and "deleterious effects on the judicial process. '64 These
factors, combined with the irreversibility of the decision, led the Reporter and
the Advisory Committee to find the institution wanting and abolition
appropriate. 6' Nonetheless, because many jurisdictions were likely to retain
61. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11 (Eng.). The Homicide Act followed the
recommendation of the Royal Commission insofar as it eliminated "constructive malice" but not with
respect to diminished responsibility. The Homicide Act embraced the notion of diminished responsibility
in the case of murder alone, an approach not recommended by the Commission.
The Homicide Act reserved the death penalty for those murders committed (a) in the course of or
furtherance of theft; (b) by shooting or causing an explosion; (c) while resisting, avoiding or preventing
arrest or escaping from lawful custody; (d) against a police officer, (e) by a prisoner killing a prison
officer, or (f) by one who had been convicted of murder on a different occasion. For a discussion and
analysis of the Homicide Act, see D.W. Elliott, The Homicide Act 1957, 1957 CRIM. L. REv. 282, and
Prevezer, supra note 60.
62. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, ch. 71 (Eng.).
63. The Model Penal Code drafters wrote:
Beyond these considerations, it is obvious that capital punishment is the most difficult of
sanctions to administer with even rough equality. A rigid legislative definition of capital
murders has proved unworkable in practice, given the infinite variety of homicides and possible
mitigating factors. A discretionary system thus becomes inevitable, with equally inevitable
differences in judgment depending on the individuals involved and other accidents of time and
place. Yet most dramatically when life is at stake, equality is, as it is generally felt to be, a
most important element of justice.
Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 64 (footnote omitted).
This "most important element ofjustice" was in considerable jeopardy under the then existing scheme
of capital punishment. The Model Penal Code Project had commissioned a report by Thorsten Sellin to
assist it in its consideration of the issue. While most of the report focused on studies dealing with the
deterrent effect of capital punishment, the report included statistics breaking down by race those who
had been executed between 1930 and 1957. Of the 3096 people executed for the crime of murder, 1516
(nearly 50%) were African American. In the South, where 55% of all executions occurred, more than
two out of three of all those put to death were African American. In situations where the murder was
accompanied by a rape, 411 men had been executed between 1930 and 1957, 370 (90%) of whom were
African American. In Georgia, the figure was 95% (54 out of 57). THORSTEm SELIrN, THE DEATH
PENALTY 6-7 (1959), reprinted in Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 220.
The Code restricted capital punishment to murder. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6. The Supreme Court,
in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), followed this principle in rejecting death as a penalty for the
crime of rape.
64. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 64.
65. Id. at 65. On the other side of the ledger, the drafters of the Model Penal Code identified factors
in favor of the death penalty: (a) the lack of evidence that death does not deter given the intuitive sense
that it should; (b) the need to express moral condemnation, and; (c) the need to prevent vigilantism. Id.
at 64-65. Weighing these considerations, the Reporter favored abolition as did the Advisory Committee
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capital punishment for years to come, the authors thought they should provide
for the practice in the Code.
66
The drafters of the Code addressed the problem of discretion in three ways.
First, they followed the Royal Commission by employing a bifurcated
sentencing procedure so that the jury could hear all relevant evidence without
fear that it would contaminate the guilt determination process. 67 Second, they
provided guidance for the sentencer by creating a class of capital murder
consisting of murder plus a finding of any one of eight aggravating circum-
stances.68 Third, they rejected the notion of leaving the jury's discretion
unguided because doing so might award "disproportionate significance" to the
aggravating circumstances.69 Instead, the drafters sought to guide the
discretion of the sentencer by requiring her to find both that an aggravating
circumstance existed and that, in light of the eight statutorily defined
mitigating circumstances and any other facts deemed relevant, "there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."70
The Model Penal Code's eight aggravating circumstances 7' form the core
by an 18-2 vote. The American Law Institute itself took no position on capital punishment. Id. at 65.
For a description of these events, cdnsult MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20-23 (1973).
The Royal Commission took no position on whether capital punishment should be abolished because
its Terms of Reference postulated the retention of capital punishment and required the Commission to
consider how its use might be limited or modified. ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 1, at 4. The
Commission arose out of a political impasse. Faced with a Labour Government committed to ending
capital punishment and a House of Lords committed to maintaining it, the British Government in 1948
created the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which issued a 500-page closely reasoned report
after about four years of study.
66. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 65. Zimring and Hawkins argue that, in view of this
opposition, the Code might have distanced itself more from the effort to legitimate capital punishment.
"[I]t would have been possible to organize the attempt to reduce the chaos in capital sentencing in ways
less likely to be interpreted as an endorsement of the penalty." Zinuing & Hawkins, supra note 49, at
796.
67. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 74.
68. Id. at 71 (referring to constructing a "class of capital murder"). Justice Harlan recognized this
feature of the Code in his McGautha opinion. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 206 n.16 (1971).
Today, of course, "[c]apital murder is murder plus one fact in aggravation." Stephen Gillers, The Quality
of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1037, 1061 (1985).
69. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 72.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2).
71. Id. § 210.6(3). For an analysis of the Code's treatment of these circumstances and an extremely
critical evaluation of the reasoning which underlies them, see Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins,
A Punishment in Search of a Crime: Standards for Capital Punishment in the Law of Criminal
Homicide, 46 MD. L. REv. 115 (1986). "The concepts and categories, the principles, and the vocabulary
that explain the model statute are abandoned in the aggravating circumstances discussion. The clarity
and precision and dialectical acumen that characterize the treatment of the mitigating circumstances are
replaced by bald assertions with scarcely any supporting reasoning." Id. at 122.
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of the new law of murder.72 They are:
1. Murder by a convict in prison;73
2. Murder by one previously convicted of murder or a violent felony;74
3. Multiple murders on the same occasion;
4. Knowingly creating a great risk of death to many persons;76
5. Murder in an attempt, perpetration, or flight from designated felonies;77
6. Murder to avoid or prevent arrest or to escape from lawful custody;7
7. Murder for pecuniary gain;79 and
8. Murder that is "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity."8
The eight mitigating circumstances are:
1. No significant history of prior crime; z
2. Murder under the influence of "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance;""2
3. Victim participated in homicidal conduct or consented to it;
8 3
72. Indeed, killing a police officer, corrections official, or firefighter (26 states) and hiring another
to kill (17 states) are the only aggravating circumstances not in the Code that are included in the
aggravating circumstances of at least half of the states. Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984:
Abandoning the Pursuit ofFairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 app. at 1229-31 (1984)
[hereinafter Special Project]. Killing a police officer was included in the English Homicide Act of 1957.
The Special Project lists 34 states as having aggravating circumstances as part of their capital
punishment statutes. Id. at 1227 n.662. The article is frequently cited as authoritative, however it does
contain a few errors. For example, the list erroneously includes Massachusetts, which does not have
capital punishment. In addition, Virginia and Texas are not on the list even though they weave
aggravating circumstances into the definition of capital murder. The Texas statute identifies murdering
a peace officer and murdering for payment as capital murders. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1),
(3) (Vest 1989). Virginia takes the same approach. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(b), (f) (Michie 1990 &
Supp. 1993).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(a). Twenty-four states employ aggravating circumstances of
this nature. Special Project, supra note 72, at 1229 n.676.
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(b). As of 1986, 23% of state prisoners incarcerated for murder
or non-negligent homicide had a criminal history including a prior violent felony. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, supra note 6, tbl. 6.66 at 615. Thirty states employ an aggravating circumstance involving
either a prior murder, a prior violent felony, or both. Special Project, supra note 72, at 1230 nn.677-78.
75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(c). Ten states consider this circumstance. Special Project, supra
note 72, at 1232 n.688.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(d). Twenty-five states consider this circumstance. Special
Project, supra note 72, at 1231 n.681.
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e). Twenty-six states consider this circumstance. Special
Project, supra note 72, at 1230-31 nn.679-80.
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(f). Twenty-two states consider this circumstance. Special
Project, supra note 72, at 1228 n.665.
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(g). Thirty-three states consider this aggravating factor. Special
Project, supra note 72, at 1227 n.664.
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(h). Twenty-one states currently consider this circumstance. An
additional four specify torture, while six consider both "heinousness" and torture. Special Project, supra
note 72, at 1228-29 nn.668-73. Florida employs "a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without
any pretense of moral or legal justification standard." Id. at 1229 n.669 (footnote omitted). In addition,
Idaho treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the defendant "exhibited utter disregard for
human life." Id. at 1229 nn.669-70.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(a).
82. Id. § 210.6(4)(b).
83. Id. § 210.6(4)(c).
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4. Defendant believed murder was morally justified or extenuated;8 4
5. Defendant was a relatively minor accomplice in murder; 5
6. Defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another;
8 6
7. Impaired capacity (through intoxication, mental disease, or mental
defect) to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform to the
law;
8 7
8. Youth of the defendant.88
Because an aggravating circumstance must exist in order for a death
sentence to be possible, the drafters of the Code did not eliminate the practice
of dividing murder into degrees. Rather, they increased the number of
divisions from two to eight, retaining felony murder and replacing premedita-
tion with seven other aggravating factors.89 Thus, the new law provided eight
alternative routes to a capital murder conviction instead of two. This approach
cuts a wide swath through potential murderers. 90 While the list excludes
someone who had no prior violent felony history and kills one individual for
a non-pecuniary reason in a non-heinous manner, it includes virtually every
other murderer.
9
'
Four circumstances locate aggravation in the harm that the defendant does
in addition to killing-an independent felony, a frustration of law enforce-
ment, the killing of an additional person, and the infliction of suffering
beyond that necessary to kill. A fifth deals with an attempt to cause such
additional harm by knowingly creating a great risk to many persons. These
five circumstances parallel felony murder in that the existence of the
additional bad act or result replaces the mens rea of premeditation as a
justification for taking the crime to a higher level of seriousness.
The three other circumstances cannot be understood on this basis. It may be
that killings by those previously convicted of a violent felony and killings for
pecuniary gain are manifestations of particularly venal character, 92 although
84. Id. § 210.6(4)(d).
85. Id. § 210.6(4)(e).
86. Id. § 210.6(4)(f).
87. Id. § 210.6(4)(g).
88. Id. § 210.6(4)(h).
89. The Reporter's initial proposal had been to "point to the main circumstances of aggravation and
of mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a
concrete case." Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 71 (emphasis in original). However, the Advisory
Committee had called for stricter controls so that, rather than using these factors simply as guides,
sentencers would have to establish at least one aggravating factor to justify a death sentence. This
created a new class of capital murderers. Id.
90. For estimates of the percentage of murders which the Model Penal Code approach covers, see
infra text accompanying notes 192-200. The Georgia figure of 86% might be a bit high since the Model
Penal Code does not recognize a felony-murder doctrine that is as l road as the felony-murder doctrine
Georgia recognizes. The Georgia figure, however, probably is not far off the mark.
91. Cf. Michael Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance:
Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REv. 523, 533
(1984) ("The survey [of Florida cases] demonstrates that virtually all reported Florida death cases have
been found especially heinous, atrocious or cruel except those resulting in instantaneous, unexpected,
death not committed 'execution style.") (emphasis in original).
92. The 1980 commentary to the Code rationalizes death eligibility for those previously convicted
of a violent felony on the grounds that such cases evoke "the strongest popular demand for capital
punishment." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 136. Moreover, the prior felony "suggests two
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why either killer is worse than someone who kills for enjoyment remains
obscure. Killings by prisoners seem to lack even this weak rationale, because
it apparently does not matter what the prisoner's prior record might have
been. Someone serving a sentence for tax fraud who kills a fellow prisoner
after an argument is, because of his prisoner status, eligible for death. The
rationale here is deterrence.93
The 1959 commentary provided no justification for either the general
approach or for the particular aggravating circumstances selected.94 Nor did
it suggest which problem these new rules solved, although arbitrariness and
inequality are the only possible candidates. 95 With the exception of "pecuni-
ary motive," the requirement that the defendant "knowingly" create a risk of
death to many, and the "purpose" to avoid or escape lawful arrest, the
inferences supporting escalation of sentence: first, that the murder reflects the character of the defendant
rather than any extraordinary aspect of the situation, and second, that the defendant is likely to prove
dangerous to life on some future occasion." Id.
93. Id.
94. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 63-80. The 1980 commentary to the Code presents a melange
of rationales. Eligibility for capital punishment is justified primarily in terms of satisfying popular
sentiment, preventing future dangerousness, and responding to depravity, manifested either in past
conduct or in the circumstances of the current killing. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 136-37; cf.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHNKING CRIMINAL LAW 339 (1978) (suggesting that eugenics may be an
explanation for some aggravating circumstances). Felony murder might be rationalized under the "bad
character" or "willingness to risk life" category because it is limited to felonies that involve the prospect
of violence, but the commentary does not clarify this point. In addition, it makes no attempt to justify
the inclusion of killing for pecuniary gain or in an effort to escape custody. Deterrence is invoked only
with respect to killing by prison inmates. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 136-37.
In their seminal work, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (I & II), 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701 & 1261
(1937), Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler (the Reporter for the Model Penal Code) presented an
extensive utilitarian analysis of the law of homicide. The authors asserted that homicidal acts could
differ from one another in terms of the extent to which they endanger lives or threaten extreme pain,
the extent to which they threaten other interests, and the extent to which they serve good ends. Id. at
1271-72.
Another element in punishment is the defendant's character, which Michael and Wechsler define as
"a man's potentialities for good and evil conduct at whatever time they are estimated." Id. at 1272.
Michael and Wechsler identify the homicidal act, the degree of intentionality, and the relationship
between the ends sought and the homicidal means employed as evidence of character. Id. at 1274-80.
They also identify age, prior behavior (particularly criminal), the degree of provocation, and the response
to the killing as relevant to the severity of sentence. Id. at 1280-90. They summarize their conclusions
in a chart which recognizes that many of these factors can cut both ways. Thus, they list factors as those
"favorable to mitigation" and those "unfavorable to mitigation." Id. at 1300.
Most of these factors found their way into the Model Penal Code. The stark exceptions are the factors
dealing with intentionality and the gap between means and ends. A gap between means and ends is
evident when persons take unnecessarily drastic measures to achieve a goal, such as killing someone
to get ahead in line at the movies.
95. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 63-80. Nothing in the original commentary to the Code
suggests improved deterrence as a rationale. Id. This is fortunate because nothing in the Code would
make this possible. Nothing in the Code's treatment of capital punishment is designed to communicate
the new ordering of seriousness to the public. The actual circumstances which make one death eligible
are not part of the common fund of knowledge of any but those who work in the area, and this is not
the group whom advocates of capital punishment identify as in need of deterrence. Because the
aggravating circumstances themselves do not reflect any clear principle, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for an individual to reason her way to the conduct which makes one death eligible.
The other difficulties with capital punishment-the baneful effect on the administration of justice,
brutalization, and irreversibility-will continue to exist as long as capital punishment is with us,
regardless of the rules governing who dies.
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aggravating circumstances do not rest upon any findings concerning the
defendant's state of mind. In this, aggravated murder resembles traditional
felony murder: once the mens rea for the underlying offense has been
established, state of mind becomes irrelevant to the question of whether the
crime is capital. Aggravating circumstances are objective and manifest in the
sense that each can be established from evidence of what the defendant in fact
did. With the exceptions noted, the sentencer has no need to inquire about or
infer from the defendant's conduct any motive or other mental state, whether
it be purpose or knowledge.
This has two consequences. First, it treats as moral equivalents those who
intend to kill during a felony and those who do not. A person who hopes that
the robbery can occur without an injury to anyone is just as guilty of capital
murder as the robber who plans to kill in order to rob. The person who kills
another slowly and painfully through incompetence is just as much a capital
murderer as one who does it purposely, for the pure pleasure of it. The second
consequence is that, with the exceptions of acting for pecuniary gain or to
avoid arrest, 96 there is no state of mind, however perverse, that can by itself
render one death eligible. With rare exceptions, killing for the joy of it is not
a capital offense.97 Participating in a robbery in which someone accidentally
dies is.
Aggravating circumstances reflect the felony murder approach in yet another
way. With the exception of the "heinousness" circumstance,98 none of them
requires the jury to evaluate what the defendant did.99 Jurors simply need to
find that she did it. Premeditation and deliberation left the jury at a loss with
respect to exactly what fact needed determination. The new law has solved
that difficulty. In the process, like the traditional felony-murder doctrine, it
96. Knowingly creating a great risk to many people requires that the defendant both kill someone
and create a great risk to others. The financial gain and avoiding arrest circumstances, on the other hand,
appear to turn at least some killings into capital murders based solely upon the defendant's reason for
killing.
97. Today, in Arizona, killing for the joy of it is an aggravating factor that can justify the death
penalty. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033 (Ariz. 1989), aff'dsub nom. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990). In Idaho, "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" murder justifies the death sentence. Arave v. Creech,
113 S. Ct. 1534, 1541-44 (1993).
98. The Supreme Court has required states to make concrete the concept of heinousness. Maynard
v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360-64 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-33 (1980). Many
states interpret the Code's notion that the provision was designed to punish the "style of killing" to refer
only to torture or the unnecessary infliction of suffering. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 652-55. Thus
interpreted, it loses its evaluative cast and more closely resembles the other aggravating circumstances.
To the extent that the circumstance retains its subjective, evaluative nature, it can be appropriately
criticized as a "standardless standard." Rosen, The Standardless Standard, supra note 10, at 945.
99. Even those contemporary aggravating circumstances which seem to require a moral evaluation
of the defendant's conduct apparently do not do so. In Arave v. Creech, Justice O'Connor rebuffed the
contention that asking the jury to find if someone was "pitiless" or "cold-blooded" was asking them to
make a subjective judgment. Distinguishing' atrocious" or 'heinous" as unconstitutionally vague terms
calling for an evaluation of a crime as a whole, Justice O'Connor insisted that "[t]he terms
'cold-blooded' and 'pitiless' describe the defendant's state of mind: not his mens rea, but his attitude
toward his conduct and his victim. The law has long recognized that a defendant's state of mind is not
a 'subjective' matter, but a fact to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances." Arave, 113 S. Ct.
1534 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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has exacerbated the problem of moral equivalency inherent in any effort to
create a capital crime.
The mitigating circumstances do not ameliorate the moral equivalency
problem. They have a narrow scope. They are either "imperfect" defenses of
duress, insanity, provocation, or juvenile status, °0 or they deal with unusual
situations such as mercy killing and Russian Roulette,' or they point to a
minor role in the murder or to a lack of a record. With the exception of the
observable facts of youth and lack of a prior record, all mitigating circum-
stances are essentially subjective.'0 2 They depend on what the defendant
believed and why he acted as he did, factors which the jury need not consider
in finding an aggravating circumstance. Given this, the comparison of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presents a considerable chal-
lenge.'0 3
Unlike aggravating circumstances, but like the defenses they resemble,
mitigating circumstances have a large evaluative component. If aggravating
circumstances operate like an element of the crime of capital murder,
mitigating circumstances operate like affirmative defenses. Because they do
not negate either an element of the crime of murder or any aggravating
circumstance, they can be ignored unless the defendant (or prosecution)
introduces them into the case. Moreover, with the exception of the defendant's
youth or lack of a criminal record, the mitigating factors are temporally
limited-they concern the defendant's behavior as of the time of the killing
and entirely ignore the defendant's history (such as whether the defendant was
abused), the social context, and the defendant's response to the crime itself.
While the Code would still permit jurors to consider these factors, it does not
direct their attention to them. In terms of what the jury is told to consider,
aggravating factors dominate.10 4
Despite the lack o?' a "principled argument" for felony murder, and the
assertion that it created worse moral problems than premeditation and
deliberation, the Code employed felony murder both in its own right and as
a model for the new law of capital murder. The Code looked to act and result
rather than to purpose and motive in grading murder.
I00. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b), (f)-(h).
101. Section 210.6(4)(c) of the Model Penal Code deals with Russian Roulette orimercy killings, and
§ 210.6(4)(d) deals with people acting from good motives (for example, euthanasia) or a belief in the
moral correctness of their action. Id. § 210.6 cmt. at 140-41.
102. While the "relatively minor role in the crime" circumstance could be established simply from
external observation of what the defendant did, ultimately a finding as to its existence rests upon a
conclusion that what the defendant did was all that he intended or wished to do. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.06(2)(c), (3)-(7) cmt. at 306-28 (1985). At bottom, then, it is subjective as well.
103. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 71, at 119-21.
104. The marked imbalance between the reach of aggravating and mitigating factors is particularly
worthy of concern because the Supreme Court has endorsed what have been characterized as the "nearly
mandatory" capital punishment schemes (for example, the jury is instructed that it shall return a death
penalty if aggravating circumstances "outweigh" mitigating ones). Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370
(1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305-09 (1990). For a useful discussion of the role of
mitigating circumstances and the Supreme Court's ambivalence toward them, see Scott E. Sundby, The
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991).
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Significantly, the commentary provided no explanation for why the Code's
approach to capital punishment solved the problems plaguing that institution.
It was (and is) not clear how these factors (felony murder and the seven
dwarves) are to combat arbitrariness and inequality except, perhaps, by
markedly increasing the number of executions within the defined catego-
ries.' In any event, the commentary to the original draft spoke primarily
in terms of controlling the discretion of juries. It did not mention, much less
address, how one might go about controlling the discretion of prosecutors in
a decentralized system in which the decision to seek capital punishment is
typically made at the county level. In addition to variations within states,
there was significant variation among states in their use of capital punishment.
As of 1959, the available evidence showed that death was imposed in only a
tiny fraction of all cases, and that in the South more than twice as many
African Americans as whites had been executed for murder. In the North,
more than twice as many whites as African Americans had been executed.
With respect to executions for rape, the national ratio was nearly ten African
Americans executed to one white. 0 6 The Code forthrightly limited capital
punishment to aggravated homicides, and thus eliminated its use for the crime
(rape) which produced the greatest racial disparity.
Beyond this, the elimination of capital punishment for the non-heinous,
non-pecuniary killer of a single individual eliminated whatever arbitrariness
and discrimination that resulted from the application of the death penalty in
this class of cases. The drafters of the Code, however, had nothing before
them which suggested that the problems of discrimination and arbitrariness
centered on these particular candidates for capital punishment. Nor did they
have any basis for the judgment that the crimes they identified as aggravated
had or would result in death sentences in a consistent apd non-discriminatory
manner.
II. THE NEW LAW ENDORSED AND APPLIED
The Model Penal Code's treatment of capital punishment did not immediate-
ly commend itself to any state legislature. Justice Harlan pointed to it as a
failed effort in his McGautha decision rejecting a due process attack on
discretionary death sentencing. He noted that, at bottom, the Code provisions
"do no more than suggest some subjects for the jury to consider during its
deliberations, and they bear witness to the intractable nature of the problem
of 'standards' which the history of capital punishment has from the beginning
reflected."' 0 7 Justice Harlan noted that the Code had, in effect, created a
new class of capital murder, but he did not believe that McGautha could
105. This was Justice White's view of what narrowing might achieve. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
106. SELLIN, supra note 63, at 6-7.
107. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971). Justice Harlan focused on whether the Code
provided meaningful guidance with respect to the ultimate issue of whether a particular defendant should
receive the death penalty, and found that it did not. Id. at 205-08.
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complain that the current first-degree murder statutes were too broad.0 5
Everything changed with the Furman v. Georgia'0 9 decision the following
year. Five justices, in five separate opinions, agreed that the Eighth Amend-
ment -invalidated statutes authorizing the discretionary imposition of death.
"Language [in those opinions] yielded support for positions ranging from a
conclusion that the death penalty was always unconstitutional to an argument
that the only constitutional form of capital punishment was a mandatory death
penalty."' 0 What the opinions shared was the view that as applied the
system of discretionary sentencing produced unconstitutional results.
In the face of this uncertainty, many states adopted mandatory capital
punishment."' In 1976, the Supreme Court changed direction. In Gregg v.
108. The question of whether the Model Penal Code effectively identified the death eligible was
relegated to a footnote. After noting that the Code created a new class of capital murderers, Justice
Harlan quickly dismissed the adequacy of this classification as an issue requiring serious consideration:
As we understand these petitioners' contentions, they seek standards for guiding the sentencing
authority's discretion, not a greater strictness in the definition of the class of cases in which
the discretion exists. If we are mistaken in this, and petitioners contend that Ohio's and
California's definitions of first-degree murder are too broad, we consider their position
constitutionally untenable.
Id. at 206 n.16.
Justice Brennan noted that Justice Harlan had not explained "why the impossibility of perfect
standards justifies making no attempt whatsoever to control lawless action." Id. at 282 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
109. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
110. Sundby, supra note 104, at 1151.
I 1l. Poulos, The Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 200-01. The deliberations of the National
Association of Attorneys General are instructive. Its Committee on Capital Punishment did not focus
upon a "good" law of capital murder, it sought a system that would pass constitutional muster. The
committee concluded that a mandatory death sentence was needed to meet the concerns expressed by
the Court in Furman, and provided lists of those kinds of killings which it believed had an "excellent,"
"fair," or "poor" chance of surviving constitutional challenge. The list, set out below, has a familiar ring.
The alternative considered most preferred as best withstanding constitutional attack is a
mandatory death penalty for specified offenses .... It was the consensus of the committee that
the following offenses would have the stated chances of success of withstanding constitutional
attack:
EXCELLENT
(1) murder of any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman acting in the line of
duty;
(2) a contract murder committed for pecuniary gain by a defendant after being hired by
any person;
(3) murder by the malicious use or detonation of any bomb or similar destructive device;
(4) murder committed by a person who had previously been convicted of murder in the
first or second degree;
(5) murder committed by a defendant while under the sentence of life imprisonment;
(6) murder committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a rape, kidnapping,
arson, armed robbery, armed burglary or when death occurs following the sexual
molestation of a child under 13 years of age;
(7) murder resulting from the hijacking of an airplane, train, bus, ship or other
commercial vehicle;
(8) multiple slayings;
(9) murder committed for purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from legal custody; and
(10) murder of a public official.
GOOD
(1) murder of a public figure.
POOR
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Georgia,'12 Proffitt v. Florida,"3 Jurek v. Texas, 114 Woodson v. North
Carolina,"5 and Roberts v. Louisiana,' the Court rejected mandatory
capital sentencing in favor of a system which involved narrowing the class of
murderers down to a group that was death eligible, and then giving the jury
(or judge) the discretion, guided or otherwise, to impose life or death. The
Court supported procedural protections as well: a separate sentencing hearing,
so that the defendant could introduce and the jury could consider mitigating
evidence, and automatic and intensive appellate review.
The plurality in Gregg rejected the view that standards were impossible by
noting the fact that "such standards have been developed," citing the Model
Penal Code." 7 Curiously, the Justices quoted that part of the commentary
calling for aggravating and mitigating circumstances to "be weighed and
weighed against each other,' ' .. and then approved the Georgia statute which
neither identified mitigating factors, nor called for weighing, nor provided the
jury with any other guidance as to how to make the decision about death.
While conceding that the Code's standards were "by necessity somewhat
general," the Court said, "they do provide guidance to the sentencing authority
and thereby reduce the likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can
be called capricious or arbitrary."".9 In the view of Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, the requirement that the jury find an aggravating circumstance
"channeled" the jury's discretion and eliminated the possibility of arbitrary
and capricious sentences. 120
(1) murder committed by assassination or by lying in wait; (Explanation: language too
broad and better covered by public official or public figure.)
(2) murder that is heinous, atrocious or cruel; (Explanation: language too broad and vague
and covered specifically in other ways.)
(3) death proximately resulting from the unlawful distribution of narcotics; and
(4) murders of passion.
NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATToRNEYs GENERAL, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 60-61 (1973).
The committee believed that mandatory death for deliberate and premeditated killings was a poor
second choice for both constitutional and practical reasons. It suggested that states might consider the
creation of an independent state Board of Review which would, "acting apart from the triers of fact,
determine that the circumstances of aggravation and mitigation are universally applied." Id. at 22-23.
The Attorneys General, then, advocated an arrangement virtually identical to the 1957 Homicide Act
as the approach best designed to meet the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment concerns. Id.
112. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), affd in part and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
113. Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
114. Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), at'd in part and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
115. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), affd in part and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
116. Roberts, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), affid in part and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
117. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193. Opponents of capital punishment appearing before the Court had taken
this view earlier. MELTSNER, supra note 65, at 162-63, 205. Whether it was fair play or not, turnabout
occurred in Gregg.
118. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 (citing Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 71) (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 193-95.
120. Id. at 206-07. Furman was distinguished:
Under the procedures before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to
give attention to the nature or circumstances of the crime committed or to the character or
record of the defendant. Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could
only be called freakish. The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's
attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the
individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating
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Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
believed that:
[A]s the types of murders ... become more ifarrowly defined and are
limited to [crimes] which are particularly serious or for which [death] is
peculiarly appropriate, it becomes reasonable to expect that juries-even
given discretion not to impose the death penalty-will impose the death
penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If they do, it can
no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly
or so infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.'
Seven years later, the Court made explicit that the Eighth Amendment
required only the narrowing of death eligibility through the requirement that
a jury find an aggravating circumstance.12 Since then, the minimal nature
of Eighth Amendment requirements has become clear. The central meaning
of Furman is clear. "Furman held that Georgia's then-standardless capital
punishment statute was being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner;
there was no principled means provided to distinguish those that received the
penalty from those that did not."'23 Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek reduce to two
requirements. The pool of murderers must first be narrowed according to
criteria that "must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."' 4 Then, once
the pool has been narrowed to those who are death eligible, the sentencing
phase must "allow[] for the consideration of mitigating circumstances and the
exercise of discretion."" 5
To meet the narrowing requirement, the law must require a finding of
something different than what the pre-Furman murder statutes required; that
is, death cannot be imposed for a killing simply on a finding of either an
intent to kill, an intent to do grievous bodily harm, an act manifesting an
abandoned and malignant heart, or the concurrent commission of a felony.
Georgia law authorized death under all of these circumstances, and Georgia
law was unconstitutional. Once one identifies an appropriate factor in
circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may
impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury
wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative
guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional
assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any
significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here.
Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 222 (Burger, C.J., and White and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
122. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). Apparently, the decision as to which factors justify
death is a decision for the state legislature, subject to the requirement that the factor be one which
cannot reasonably be applied to all who are death eligible. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542
(1993) ("If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirnm.') (emphasis in
original). In Creech, the Court upheld the Idaho aggravating circumstance that the defendant exhibited
"utter disregard" for human life on the grounds that the Idaho courts had construed this circumstance
to apply only to those killings which were "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" and not all of those who were
death eligible under Idaho law could be said to meet these criteria. Id. at 1542-43.
123. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
124. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877.
125. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
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aggravation to that law, however, the Eighth Amendment arbitrariness concern
is satisfied. 26 The Court does not appear to insist upon an additional factor;
subtraction appears to work as well. Narrowing can be achieved either by
retaining the traditional categories of murder and adding an aggravating factor
or by eliminating some of the traditional categories of murder. Major
participants in felony murder are apparently death eligible for that reason
alone, 127 as they would have been under pre-Furman law. The difference is
that the post-Furman statute is not as inclusive as the pre-Furman statute.
The aggravating factor can appear either in the definition of the substantive
crime or as a factor to be found during the sentencing phase. 28 Indeed, the
same facfor that renders a homicide murder can also serve as the aggravating
circumstance which makes one death eligible. 2 9
Other than the brief statement in Zant v. Stephens that an aggravating
circumstance must "reasonably justify" death for this defendant as contrasted
to the general run of murderers, the Court has provided little illumination as
to whether there are substantive limits on the narrowing criteria. 3  The
126. Zant, 462 U.S. 862.
127. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
128. Arave v. Creech provides the most recent formulation:
When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to
distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the circumstance
must provide a principled basis for doing so. If a sentencer fairly could conclude that an
aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the
circumstance is constitutionally infirm.
113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542 (1993) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
129. Felony murder raises this problem. In Georgia, for example, the felony-murder doctrine makes
a killing capital murder and suffices as an aggravating circumstance. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(b)(20).
Tison, 481 U.S. 137, held that the Eighth Amendment required only a "reckless indifference to human
life" to support felony murder as an aggravating circumstance. This, of course, embraces a very large
portion of all felony murders. To the extent that there is little or no difference between felony murder
as it existed in 1972 and the requirements of felony murder as an aggravating circumstance, the
technical requirement that there must be a fact in aggravation "in addition" to murder may be satisfied
by a fact which was necessarily established in finding the defendant guilty of murder. Rosen identifies
Georgia, Florida, Wyoming, and South Carolina as states "in which a defendant can be found guilty of
first degree murder under a felony murder theory and in which the same underlying felony can serve
as an aggravating factor to justify imposition of the death penalty ... " Rosen, Felony Murder, supra
note 10, at 1126 n.62.
130. Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 349-60; Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 S. CT. REV.
305, 328-35 (1984); Scott Howe, Resolving the Conflict in Capital Cases; A Desert Oriented Theory
of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 384-87 (1992). Professor Howe notes that the narrowing function
of the Georgia system approved in Zant does not "correspond to any Eighth Amendment principle." Id.
at 385.
The Court in dicta has given a justification for making the killing of a police officer an aggravating
circumstance:
To be sure, the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties
may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance. There is a special interest in affording
protection to these public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the
safety of other persons and property.
We recognize that the life of a police officer is a dangerous one. Statistics show that the
number of police officers killed in the line of duty has more than doubled in the last 10 years.
In 1966, 57 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty; in 1975, 129 were killed.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1977) (citation omitted).
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Court has struggled with the procedural treatment of aggravating circum-
stances.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the doctrine remains opaque. 32 What the Court
has done is create an Eighth Amendment "void for vagueness" doctrine.
Constitutionally adequate narrowing has not occurred if the jury is permitted
to return death upon finding that the crime "was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim.' ' 33 Such criteria are facially vague and
violate the Eighth Amendment requirement for specificity. 134 This criterion
131. The Court refuses to recognize frankly that it has imposed a new doctrine of substantive law.
It is plainly true that:
[t]he requirement that there be at least one aggravating circumstance, in addition to the murder
itself, has simply led to the creation of a new crime, capital murder, one of whose elements
is the aggravating circumstance. Like any element of a crime, it is a fact that a jury must find
true beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant may receive the heightened sentence the
new crime carries.
Gillers, supra note 68, at 1050.
The Court has ruled that a decision returning a life verdict precludes, on double jeopardy grounds,
a sentence of death upon retrial when "the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was like the
trial on the question of guilt or innocence .... Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981); see
also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984). In the non-capital area, a longer sentence following
retrial does not violate the double jeopardy clause. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Bullington distinguished Stroud v. United States, which, in the pre-Furman era, found no constitutional
violation in sentencing someone to death following a reversal of a conviction that carried an original
life sentence. Stroud, 251 U.S. 15 (1919). A life verdict precludes a later death sentence even if the
reason why death was not imposed was that the sentencer misunderstood the relevant law and failed to
find an aggravating circumstance despite evidence which supported it. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 211. Also,
the Court has recognized that the state's failure to establish any aggravating circumstance makes one
"innocent" of capital murder, and therefore eligible for habeas consideration even on a second petition.
Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2522-23 (1992).
Despite its recognition that aggravating circumstances operate like an element of a crime in the
double jeopardy context, the Court has acquiesced in state arrangements that permit a judge as opposed
to a jury to determine the existence of an aggravating circumstance. The Court in Hildwin v. Florida,
490 U.S. 638 (1989), and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), held that judges as opposed to juries
could make both the substantive (the existence of an aggravating circumstance) and sentencing (that
death is the appropriate sentence) findings. The Court's views on this subject have been repeatedly and
pointedly criticized. Gillers, supra note 68, at 1061-95; Poulos, Liability Rules, supra note 10, at 646-47.
See generally Ledewitz, supra note 10 (analyzing the role of the aggravating circumstance requirement
in death penalty cases); Weisberg, supra note 130 (discussing the history of the Supreme Court's effort
to regulate application of the death penalty).
132. Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 349-60 suggests what the terms ought to mean. However, the reality
is quite different. See infra text accompanying note 133 (describing the reach of the Georgia scheme).
It is clear to us, however, that functionally, the aggravating factors in the Act are indistinguish-
able, for this purpose, from the elements of a crime. For example, no more or no less than
premeditation under our prior law, proof of an aggravating factor could mark the difference
between imprisonment and death. There is no reason for requiring definiteness in the former
but not in the latter.
State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 226 n.27 (N.J. 1987) (citation omitted); accord, State v. Silhan, 275
S.E.2d 450, 482 (Sup. Ct. N.C. 1981).
133. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422 (1980) (quoting GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978));
accord Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
134. In Maynard, 486 U.S. 356, the Court rejected Oklahoma's argument that an aggravating
circumstance was not void for vagueness if the conduct in question fell within the core meaning of the
statute and was conduct that the state could appropriately sanction. Such an approach might be
reasonable under the Due Process Clause, the Court agreed, but the Eighth Amendment required
narrowing from among a group of murderers any one of whose act would seem to fall within the core
meaning of an aggravated circumstance of "vileness."
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can be rescued if a state court gives it a narrowing construction. 35 The
Court has not invalidated any other aggravating circumstance on the grounds
that the circumstance does an inadequate job of narrowing.'36
The ultimate decision to impose capital punishment on a given individual
remains essentially where it was before Furman; like the law of murder that
it replaces, aggravating circumstance murder identifies the death eligible and
opens the door to consideration of whether the person should actually die.
37
Some states require that the aggravating circumstances be balanced with
identified mitigating factors, 38 other states provide no guidance,' 39 and
others let the lethal decision turn on the sentencers' predictions as to future
dangerousness. 4 The death sentence might even be "nearly mandatory" in
the sense that the jury is instructed to return death if aggravating factors
outweigh mitigating ones.' 4' To the extent that these approaches usefully
guide the sentencers' discretion, and to the extent that the bifurcated trial
facilitates a full consideration of relevant evidence, perhaps the current system
improves what it replaced. If so, that improvement is in the process of
choosing among the death eligible; it is not in the process of determining who
is in that category. The very proposal that the drafters of the Model Penal
Code rejected-a new class of capital murder plus discretionary sentenc-
ing-on the grounds that it gave "disproportionate significance to the
enumeration of aggravating circumstances" '42 has become the constitutional-
ly approved law of the land.
135. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-56 (1990) (approving a limiting instruction that allowed
the jury to sentence defendant to death if she intended or should have foreseen that her actions would
inflict, before death, physical abuse or mental anguish, including the anguish of not knowing one's
ultimate fate).
136. The Court has employed a proportionality analysis to invalidate death for rape, Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and for a marginal participant in a felony who neither killed, intended
to kill, nor anticipated that killing might occur, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). On the other
hand, death is proportional in a state scheme rendering death eligible those who are major participants
in felonies that result in death and whose participation in the felony manifests a reckless indifference
as to death. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). In simple terms, proportionality asks whether the
punishment fits the crime, whereas the narrowing inquiry asks whether there is an unacceptable risk that
death will be imposed arbitrarily. The difficulty with the Georgia murder statute was that it permitted
death to be imposed randomly among those potentially eligible for execution, whereas the difficulty with
the Georgia rape statute is that it permitted death to be imposed for criminal behavior that did not
warrant that sanction.
137. "Once the sentencer credits the aggravating circumstance, it may choose to impose a death
sentence, but it may also choose not to. For constitutional purposes, its decision at this point may be
as unguided as under the pre-Furman statutes, as the Court has marginally acknowledged." Gillers,
supra note 68, at 1050.
138. This is the Florida model, which is followed in the large majority of all capital punishment
states. Raymond J. Pascucci et al., Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and
Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1220-21 n.615 (1984).
139. This is the Georgia model, followed in five states. Id. at 1221 n.617.
140. This is the case in Texas and Virginia. Id. at 1221-22.
141. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
142. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, at 71-72.
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B. Applying Aggravating Circumstances
One way to get a sense of how aggravating circumstances operate is to
apply the new law to some representative death cases under the pre-1972
law-the capital murders the Supreme Court considered in McGautha v.
California,143 Furman v. Georgia,144 and Fisher v. United States. 4' The
McGautha court believed that it was beyond the capacity of a legal regime to
make meaningful improvements on the system that resulted in death penalties
for Dennis C. McGautha and James E. Crampton, whereas a majority of the
Court appeared to believe differently about the legal regime that condemned
William H. Furman. Fisher presents a different type of murder than the three
cases already identified and is worth considering for that reason. While the
decision did not involve a direct attack on capital punishment, the drafters of
the Code pointed to the Fisher Court's rejection of the diminished capacity
defense as an example of the difficulties with the premeditation formula.
46
In McGautha, two men, McGautha and Wilkinson, committed armed
robbery in two different stores on the same day. In the second store,
[w]hile one defendant forcibly restrained a customer, the other struck Mrs.
Smetana on the head. A shot was fired, fatally wounding Mr. Smetana.
Wilkinson's former girl friend testified that shortly after the robbery
McGautha told her he had shot a man and showed her an empty cartridge
in the cylinder of his gun. Other evidence at the guilt stage was inconclu-
sive on the issue as to who fired the fatal shot. McGautha conceded that
he had been convicted of four prior felonies. The California jury found
both defendants guilty of two counts of armed robbery and one count of
first-degree murder as charged. 4 '
Crampton was a domestic killer. He murdered his wife with a shot from a
.45 caliber revolver while she was using the toilet in her home. They had been
married only four months at the time, and he recently had been hospitalized
for alcoholism and drug addiction. Crampton had made a number of calls to
his wife before the murder, and she had sought and received police protection.
He was found guilty under Ohio law for murdering his wife "purposely and
with premeditated malice."'
4
Furman "killed a householder while seeking to enter the home at night.
Furman shot the deceased through a closed door. He was 26 years old and had
143. McGautha, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The opinion discusses two capital murder convictions; it
consolidates McGautha with Crampton v. Ohio.
144. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
145. Fisher, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
146. Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 4, cmt. 3 at 69. Fisher held that a jury need not consider the
defendant's mental incapacity short of insanity in determining whether the defendant had the capacity
to and, in fact, did premeditate and deliberate. Fisher, 328 U.S. at 470. The Code rejected the Fisher
holding both directly in § 4.02 and through the expansive definition of provocation in § 210.3(l)(b). It
also embraced the related doctrine of partial responsibility (impaired capacity permits a finding of life
as opposed to death) through its listing of mitigating factors. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g). The
Fisher rule is now unconstitutional in death cases. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-24 (1989).
147. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 187.
148. Id. at 191-93.
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finished the sixth grade in school."'49 He had ten prior convictions for
burglary and had served time in prison.1'°,He claimed he had tripped over
a wire and the gun went off accidentally, killing the homeowner who had
discovered Furman's entry.'1
5
Fisher worked as a janitorial employee in a church library. The victim was
the librarian, who had complained of Fisher's work. As the majority opinion
related the facts,
The petitioner testified that Miss Reardon [the victim] was killed by him
immediately following insulting words from her over his care of the
premises. After slapping her impulsively, petitioner ran up a flight of steps
to reach an exit on a higher level but turned back down, after seizing a
convenient stick of firewood, to stop her screaming. He struck her with the
stick and when it broke choked her to silence. He then dragged her to the
lavatory and left the body to clean up some spots of blood on the floor
outside. While Fisher was doing this cleaning up, the victim "started
hollering again." Fisher then took out his knife and stuck her in the throat.
She was silent.'52
Two other facts about Fisher must be related. First, the knife wound
apparently was not fatal; it "just went through the skin." Second, according
to Fisher the insult from the victim was racial: she called him a "black
nigger," something no white person had ever done before.'53 How would
each of these killers fare under the contemporary law of aggravated murder?
149. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 252 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). The other two
defendants in Furman each received their death sentence for the crime of rape. Id. at 239.
150. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 85 (1990). Justice White
noted in his concurring opinion:
I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the
facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving
crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion, as I have said, is that the
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that
there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not. The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority
primarily in juries-a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the
law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence as well as guilt or inno-
cence-has so effectively achieved its aim that capital punishment within the confines of the
statutes now before us has for all practical purposes run its course.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
According to Baldus, Furman was 18 years old at the time of the shooting. This appears inconsistent
with other facts Baldus notes-that he had 10 prior convictions for burglary and had served time in
prison-and suggests that the Supreme Court's indication that he was 26 is accurate. Whatever his age,
the factors place him in the highest culpability group according to the Baldus study. Nonetheless
"convicted murderers whose overall culpability approximated that of Furman received death sentences
only one-third of the time. This finding supports Justice White's intuitive judgment that Furman's crime
seemed no more serious than hundreds of other cases he had reviewed that had resulted only in prison
sentences." BALDUS ET AL., supra at 85-86.
151. Furman v. State, 167 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
152. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 465 (1946).
153. Id. at 479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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1. Furman
Furman would be death eligible under the Model Penal Code and under the
law of Georgia where the crime occurred. Felony murder makes one guilty of
the crime of murder and serves as an aggravated circumstance under both the
Model Penal Code and Georgia law. Moreover, neither the Model Penal Code
nor Georgia law require that the defendant intend to kill.'5 4 Furman might
also be death eligible under the Code due to his history of criminality. This
would depend upon whether, in the language of section 210.6(3)(b), he had
been convicted of "a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person." The Georgia Supreme Court held a similar aggravating circumstance
unconstitutional on the grounds that it did not adequately control the
discretion of the sentencer, and it is no longer part of Georgia law. 55
2. McGautha
McGautha would be death eligible under the Model Penal Code and under
the terms of the California statute, which requires traditional murder and a
special circumstance (here, felony murder) for a death sentence. 56 More-
over, his four prior felonies could certainly be considered by the jury in
determining whether aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
circumstances, although they alone would not have rendered him death
eligible.' Had McGautha or Furman committed their crimes in Texas or
Louisiana, their death eligibility would turn on whether they intended to
murder (in Texas) or had the specific intent to kill or do serious bodily harm
(in Louisiana).'58 At bottom, however, those who kill while committing
154. Rosen, Felony Murder, supra note 10, at 1103, 1126 n.62 (describing Georgia as a state in
which there is no mens rea requirement for felony murder). Because Furman was the actual killer, the
literal terms of neither Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that death was not appropriate
for non-triggerman who neither killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill), nor Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that death was appropriate for non-triggerman whose participation in a felony
manifested extreme recklessness), apply. Rosen, Felony Murder, supra note 10, at 1147 n.140.
155. Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1976). Now, only a prior capital felony qualifies as an
aggravating circumstance in Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. 17-10-30(b)(1).
156. CAL. CODE ANN. §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West 1993). There is some question as to what state
of mind, if any, McGautha needed with respect to the special circumstance of felony murder. In People
v. Green, 609 P.2d 468 (Cal. 1980), the California Supreme Court ruled that the killing had to be done
with the intent of furthering the felony. However, in People v. Kimble, 749 P.2d 803 (Cal. 1988),
modified, slip op. (Cal. 1988), the court appeared to back away from the requirement of an independent
mens rea for a special circumstance. John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment: The
Original Understanding of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 333, 413-20 (1990).
157. The California Code identifies the special circumstances that must exist for a defendant to be
death eligiblt. Section 190.2(a)(2) treats a prior record for murder as a special circumstance. Once the
defendant is death eligible, section 190.3(c) treats the presence or absence of any prior felony conviction
as a factor to be weighed in determining whether the defendant is sentenced to death. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.2-.3 (West 1988).
158. Tax. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30A (West 1993). Five
other states impose an intent to kill requirement at the guilt determination stage-Alabama, Ohio,
Oregon, Utah, and Virginia. In addition, five other states-Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, and New
Mexico-put an intent to kill requirement into the aggravating circumstance itself. Finally, two
states-Missouri and Pennsylvania-reject felony murder as the basis for determining guilt of capital
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felonies-the McGauthas and Furmans of the world-are death eligible in
virtually any state in this country that embraces capital punishment.
3. Crampton
Crampton would be guilty of aggravated murder under Ohio law because he
"purposely, and with prior calculation and design" killed his wife.'59 He
would not be eligible for the death penalty, however, because his crime did
not involve any of the aggravating circumstances necessary to justify a death
penalty under Ohio law. 6 ' Specifically, Ohio does not consider "heinous-
ness" as an aggravating circumstance.
Whether Crampton would be death eligible under the Model Penal Code
turns upon how expansively a court interprets section 2 10.6.3(h): "The murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravi-
ty." The commentary to the Code suggests that this provision is concerned
with the "style of killing."' 6 If so, Crampton escapes death eligibility
because he killed efficiently.
The Court has not required the twenty-three states 62 that employ this
aggravating circumstance to adhere to the Code interpretation that it refers
solely to the style of the actual killing. 163 Thus, one might point to
Crampton's repeated calls to his wife and his string of threats as indicative
of a desire to make her suffer psychologically before he actually killed her.
However, even in the states that consider psychic suffering before death to be
indicative of exceptional depravity, no case seems to go so far as to treat
murder but employ an aggravating circumstance that the killing be committed during the perpetration
of the felony. Rosen, Felony Murder, supra note 10, at 1130 nn.68 & 69.
159. OH-no REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Anderson 1993).
160. The Ohio Code provides that the death penalty is "precluded" unless one or more of eight
aggravating circumstances is present. These circumstances include assassination of particular government
officials, murder for hire, murder to escape the processes of the law, murder by a prisoner, murder by
a convicted killer, murder of a peace officer, murder during certain felonies, and murder of a witness.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.04(A)(l)-(A)(8). None of the circumstances cover the deliberate killing
of one's spouse.
161. MODEL PENAL CODE cmt. 6(a).
162. Rosen, The Standardless Standard, supra note 10, at 943, lists 24 such states but includes
California whose Supreme Court rejected the circumstance as unconstitutionally vague. People v.
Superior Court, 647 P.2d 76, 81 (Cal. 1982).
163. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990), upheld an interpretation that includes mental
as well as physical suffering by the victim before death, including the victim's uncertainty as to her fate.
Additionally, State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 798 (Ariz. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992),
reaffirms the view that cruelty can include mental as well as physical suffering.
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Crampton's action as meeting the test.'" Because he killed with a single
shot, Crampton cannot be executed.
4. Fisher
Fisher prdsents the test case for the narrowing function of the new law. The
bare facts of this case-an African American male inefficiently killing a white
woman whom he encountered in her official capacity-suggest that prosecu-
tors would seek the death penalty and juries would probably award it.
However, as long as Fisher did not take anything from Ms. Reardon after
killing her, in the fourteen states that do not embrace "heinousness" killing,
Fisher could not receive the death sentence. Of course, if Fisher did take
something after the attack so that the killing could be considered to have been
committed during the course of a felony such as robbery, then he would
probably be death eligible everywhere. 65
What of the states which embrace the heinousness aggravating circum-
stance? Because the killing took place over a period of time and involved a
blow with a blunt object, strangulation, and the use of a knife, the killing
would probably fall within most definitions of heinousness. 66 The victim's
remaining alive and apparently conscious while Fisher attempted to clean up
164. Indeed, the few cases on the subject go in the opposite direction. In State v. Stanley, 312 S.E.2d
393, 398 (N.C. 1984), the North Carolina Supreme Court found no psychological torture when the
defendant drove back and forth in front of his house, his wife cried "Please Stan," and then he shot her
nine times in rapid succession. Even more dramatically, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that an
aggravating circumstance calling for "heightened premeditation" ("committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification," FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(5)(i)) was not supported by evidence of a calculated domestic murder because "[t]here was no
deliberate plan formed through calm and cool reflection,. . . only mad acts prompted by wild emotion."
Santos v. State, 591 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1991).
With respect to the heinousness provision, Crampton's killing falls within the small group of cases
that are exempted from its reach in a state like Florida. "The survey [of Florida cases] demonstrates that
virtually all reported Florida death cases have been found especially heinous, atrocious or cruel except
those resulting in instantaneous, unexpected, death not committed 'execution style'." Mello, supra note
91, at 533 (emphasis in original).
165. Singleton v. State, 465 So. 2d 432 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983) is a case which shares much in
common with Fisher. Singleton killed a nun whom he encountered in a graveyard after asking her to
pray for him. His confession revealed Singleton to be a person of limited intelligence, and his manner
of killing suggested that he, like Fisher, did not intend to kill as much as he intended to make his victim
be quiet. Following the killing, however, Singleton took the victim's watch. This fact permitted the state
to charge him with felony murder, and thus convict him of capital murder. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(2).
At this point, the jury must find an aggravating circumstance, one of which is the "heinousness" of the
killing. Id. § 13A-5-49(8). Singleton was executed on November 20, 1992. Colman McCarthy, Barbaric
Government Killing, WAsH. POST, Dec. 5, 1992, at A23.
In California there is precedent for the proposition that the killing must occur to advance an
underlying crime, such as robbery, for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. People v.
Green, 609 P.2d 468, 504-06 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, slip op. (U.S. 1993). Under this interpretation,
Singleton might have been spared. However, more recent decisions cast doubt on the Green holding.
People v. Kimble, 749 P.2d 803, 816 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988), and cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1038 (1990). For a discussion of these developments, see Poulos, supra note 156, at 413-20.
166. Rosen, The Standardless Standard, supra note 10, at 965-88.
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the library would support such a finding. 67 Although courts may speak as
though heinousness was reserved for instances of "extreme and outrageous
depravity exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or
an utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of another,"' 68 their
practice is to uphold a finding of the aggravating circumstance when the
victim consciously suffers during the attack. 69 Clumsy killers 'are heinous
killers.
7 0
But what of Fisher's lack of desire or purpose to make Reardon suffer? As
Justice Frankfurter noted in his powerful dissent, it is difficult to read the
record without concluding that Fisher's only conscious desire was to stop Ms.
Reardon from screaming.' While the defendant's state of mind is relevant
to a finding of heinousness, few states make a purpose to cause suffering a
prerequisite to such a finding. Thus, Arizona courts recognize "apparent
relishing of the murder" as one of five factors that go into a determination of
heinousness, 7 2 but it appears to be sufficient if the defendant was negligent
with respect to whether the victim would suffer. '7 Florida also contradicts
itself on this point. 74 While language in decisions in other states points to
some mens rea element, it does not get much emphasis.
7 1
In general, heinousness can be found in what the defendant did without
great concern for whether it was his actual purpose to cause extraordinary
suffering. 7 6 These results have some odd features. Of the four killers, only
167. As to the importance of the victim's remaining conscious, see, for exaample, State v. Lavers,
814 P.2d 333 (Axiz. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991); Ponticelli v. State, 593 So. 2d 483 (Fla.
1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992) (judgment vacated in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926
(1992)); Taylor v. State, 404 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 393 (1991); State v. Artis,
384 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023 (1990); and Fox v. State, 779
P.2d 562, 576 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990).
168. Wickham v. State, 593 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3003 (1992).
169. Mello, supra note 91, at 551.
170. New Jersey is an exception. Ramseur v. State, 524 A.2d 188, 229 (N.J. 1987), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
171. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 479 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
172. State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 799 (Ariz. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992).
173. State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22, 33 (Ariz. 1991).
174. Compare Wickham v. State, 593 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3003
(1992), with Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 311 (1991),
and vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992) (judgment vacated in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926
(1992)).
175. Rosen concludes that as of 1986 "the only thing that the cases have in common is that the
reviewing courts have been able to find something disturbing in each case." Rosen, The Standardless
Standard, supra note 10, at 989 (emphasis in original). Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988),
which reaffirmed Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), suggests that the Supreme Court continues
to be concerned about the lack of precision in state court approaches to the "heinousness" circumstance.
While the Court insists upon a limiting construction, it has not required that the circumstance be limited
to torture or serious physical abuse. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365. The Court has never addressed the issue
of whether any mens rea is required for this or any other aggravating circumstance.
176. When it comes to an aggravating circumstance limited to torture, however, at least two
states-California and Pennsylvania-affirmatively insist on proof that the defendant actually intended
to inflict pain beyond that inherent in the act of killing. People v. Raley, 830 P.2d 712, 729 (Cal. 1992),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1352 (1993) (holding that the killing must be committed "with a wilful,
deliberate, premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for the
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose," (quoting CALIFORNIA JURY INST.
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one-Crampton-planned to kill. He alone expended considerable effort
locating the victim in order to kill. He is the only one about whose purpose
to kill there can be no doubt. Yet he is the only one who is not death eligible
under the terms of the Code or, for that matter, in the overwhelming majority
of capital states.'77 He alone cannot be coed by a prosecutor's threat to
seek the death penalty because he alone knows that his crime does not make
him death eligible. He is the beneficiary of the narrowing of capital
punishment. If there is a principle of moral equivalency operating here, it is
one that treats defendants who did not plan to kill as more depraved than
those who did.
Crampton differed from the other killers because he alone killed an
intimate. McGautha and Furman apparently did not know their victims,
whereas Fisher's contact with his victims grew out of a working relationship,
not a social or intimate one.'78 That Crampton is exempted from death while
the others remain eligible is not fortuitous. The result flows from the decision
to adopt the felony-murder model for aggravating circumstances. The
paradigmatic victim of a felony murder is a stranger; the rational felon
victimizes people who do not know him or her. The paradigmatic victim of
a truly premeditated killing is someone whom the killer knows and thinks
about, such as a wife, husband, or lover. While this difference received no
explicit attention in the Code's commentary, the stark difference between the
law's response to killing strangers as opposed to intimates has become a
hallmark of the new law of murder.'"
Crampton, McGautha, and Furman all used guns, but this does not enhance
their chance of being executed. Indeed, it is precisely because Fisher did not
use a gun that his "style of killing" would render him death eligible today.
Similarly, it was Crampton's efficient use of a gun that immunizes him from
death. This is a somewhat strange result, given the practice of increasing a
sentence if someone uses a gun in the commission of a crime. 80 McGautha
and Furman each had a felony history but, in the states in which they
committed their crimes, this fact alone would not make them death eligible.
CRIMINAL § 8.24 (Arnold Levin ed., 1988)) (emphasis in original)); Commonwealth v. Chester, 587
A.2d 1367, 1381 (Pa. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 152 (1991), and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 422 (1991)
(the state "must prove that the defendant intended to inflict a considerable amount of pain and suffering
on the victim .... Implicit in the definition of torture is the concept that the pain and suffering imposed
on the victim was unnecessary, or more than needed to effectuate the demise of the victim." (footnote
omitted)).
177. If a state employed a "cold and calculating" aggravating circumstance and, unlike the Florida
Supreme Court in Santos v. State, 591 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1991), interpreted it in a way which embraced
domestic killings, Crampton's crime might render him death eligible.
178. Barnett's analysis of Georgia data suggests that, in the eyes of a sentencing jury, a work or
professional relationship resembles that of a stranger relationship. These are the cases in which juries
are most likely to impose death. Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death
Sentence, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1327, 1340-41 (1985).
179. Rapaport, supra note 10.
180. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1936), represents an effort to achieve this result
through the use of sentencing factors. The more typical approach is to create a different crime with a
higher penalty for certain felonies committed while armed.
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Finally, in 1972 the Supreme Court saw nothing unusual about Furman's
case: nothing, that is, which justified putting him to death while numerous
murderers like him received life. This is still true except that now society can
put Furman to death with a constitutionally clean conscience. Although neither
before 1972 nor today do more than three out of ten murderers like Furman
receive death,' 8 ' what was once arbitrary and capricious has now become
regular and rational. What society has gained or lost through this process
remains to be explored in Part III.
III. THE NEW LAW EVALUATED
The new law of murder has not delivered on its explicit promise of
eliminating arbitrariness in the imposition of death,1 2 nor on its implicit
commitment to drive racial considerations from the death sentencing
process. 3 This result is not surprising-there was and is no basis for
believing that substituting aggravating circumstances for premeditation and
deliberation could tame the forces which produce unevenness and inequali-
ty.'8 4 While Coker v. Georgia8'5 eliminated the most egregious instance
of defendant-based discrimination, Gregg v. Georgia and Zant v. Stephens
have validated the narrowing of the number of death eligible in a manner that
can, and frequently does, heighten the role that the race of the victim plays
in death decisions. The existence of statutorily defined aggravating circum-
stances has also facilitated the process that drives the criminal justice
system-plea bargaining.
Precisely because they are specific, factual, and ascertainable at the time of
indictment, aggravating circumstances play a central role in the processing of
homicide cases. They influence charging and plea bargaining decisions.
Because most murders, like most other crimes, are adjudicated by negotiation
and plea rather than by. trial, few issues assume greater importance than
whether the case is potentially capital or not. Whatever might be said for the
prospect of death as a deterrent to crime, there can be little question that the
prospect of a death sentence exerts a powerful influence once the defendant
has been apprehended and must decide how to plead. 6 Death can be the
181. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150, at 84-85.
182. BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 151-61
(1987); Jonathon R. Sorenson & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in
Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 743, 775-76 (1991).
183. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 182, at 751-57 (reviewing findings of empirical studies on
this issue).
184. This is particularly true given that there is no control over the discretion of the sentencer once
a statutory aggravating circumstance is present. See Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 348.
185. Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that death is an unconstitutionally disproportionate
sentence for the crime of rape).
186. "I begin with the premise that, in the vast majority of cases, success in a capital case means
having the client sent to prison for life." William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty
Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 278-79 (1990-91) (emphasis added).
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price for a refusal to plead or otherwise cooperate.8 7 "Indeed, an examina-
tion of the system as it actually operates suggests that in fact the most
important function of the death penalty may be to facilitate prosecutors'
efforts to induce guilty pleas."' 8
This is not news. The same situation existed before Furman.8 9 The
difference today is that aggravating circumstances create the appearance (and,
to varying degrees, the reality) of precisely delineating the conditions under
which a case can be capital. While this means that a certain percentage of all
murderers cannot be death eligible (and therefore cannot be bluffed into
worrying about a death sentence), it might have the opposite effect with those
whose crimes clearly fall within the death eligible category.
For the group whom the statute has identified in advance, it is no longer
just a matter of the prosecutor's discretionary decision. Rather, the law itself
indicates that these are the criminals who should face the possibility of
execution."' This strengthens the prosecutor's bargaining position while
also permitting her to distance herself from responsibility for the decision to
seek death. Indeed, the entire superstructure of contemporary death penalty
arrangements, with its promise of seemingly endless appeals and review, may
provide moral comfort to one determining whether to seek the death
penalty.' 9' Thus, the prosecutor's bargaining position depends on whether
the circumstances surrounding the killer, the killing, and the victim can
support a finding of capital murder. If yes, the prosecutor has a very strong
position indeed. Even if, as in Georgia, the odds that a jury will agree with
the prosecutor seeking capital punishment are only a little better than
187. This occurred in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). The younger Tisons refused to plead
and cooperate with the prosecutor and, as a result, they received death sentences.
188. WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES 46-47 (1987).
189. The Royal Commission Report on Capital Punishment describes plea bargaining over capital
indictments as a central feature of the American experience. "In substance, as some witnesses frankly
stated, an indictment for murder in the first degree is a bargaining weapon which is employed freely and
with great effect." ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 1, at 188.
190. Baldus and his associates speculate that the institution of aggravating circumstances "might also
have invited juries to impose death sentences more frequently in those cases in which they learned that,
on the basis of legislatively enacted criteria, the defendants were death eligible. The higher death-
sentencing rates in the post-Furman period tend to support this hypothesis." BALDUS ET AL., supra note
150, at 103 (footnote omitted). The circumstances of a contemporaneous felony and a particularly vile
murder were particularly influential as they were transformed, post-Furman, into statutory aggravating
circumstances. These features were present either separately or together in 57% of all murders before
Furman and 68% after 1973. However, among those actually sentenced to death, a contemporaneous
felony was present in 54% of all cases before Furman as contrasted to 88% in the cases after 1973; for
a vile killing, the figures went from 50% before Furman to 83% after Furman. Id. at 104.
191. Referring to the sentencing decision itself, Weisberg makes the following observation:
In the case of the death penalty, the law has sometimes offered the sentencer the illusion of
a legal rule, so that no actor at any point in the penalty procedure need feel that he has chosen
to kill any individual. But our ambivalence has simply manifested itself in the clumsy
administiative and legal complexities with which we have undone the innumerable death
sentences which we have generated.
Weisberg, supra note 130, at 393.
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50-50,192 the stakes are as high as the law permits. And the prosecutor can
bet these stakes in a large number of cases.
A. Narrowing in Pursuit of Consistency
Some gross statistics help demonstrate the reach of the Model Penal Code's
aggravating circumstances. Nearly a quarter (23%) of all prisoners convicted
of murder and non-negligent homicide have a prior violent felony conviction
(and more than half have a felony conviction of some kind), 193 and
approximately 20% of all murders and non-negligent homicides involve a
felony circumstance. 194 While there are no national statistics concerning the
percentage of killings that qualify as heinous,'95 in 1991 approximately 34%
of all murders and non-negligent homicides involved a weapon other than a
gun and nearly 18% of all murders and non-negligent homicides involve use
of something other than a gun or knife.'9 6 Killings committed without a gun
are most likely to be slow and inefficient and thus most likely to be viewed
as heinous.' 97 For 1991, 16% of victims were family members, intimates,
or acquaintances of the assailant, 47% were family members or acquaintances,
and 15% were strangers (the category of victims most likely to result in death
sentences).'9
It is not possible to make even a rough approximation from national
statistics of how many killings create a risk to a great many people, or how
many involve pecuniary gain. 199 These various categories overlap, and the
192. This is the finding of the Barnett study for Georgia. Barnett, supra note 178, at 1352. Texas
is different. In Texas, juries gave the death penalty to 77% of defendants convicted of capital murder
between 1974 and 1988. Sorenson & Marquart, supra note 182, at 769.
193. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
STATISTICS, 1990, tbl. 6.66 at 615. The data discussed in the text are for 1986.
194. The Supplementary Homicide Reports (1976-1989) place the figure at 18% over a 13-year
period. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS (1976-1989) [hereinafter SHR].
These reports are compiled by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Section ("UCR") from information
collected from local law enforcement agencies. Dean James Fox of the Northeastern University College
of Criminal Justice and director of the National Crime Analysis Program at Northeastern provided the
data for Supplemental Homicide Reports (1976-1989). Other investigators estimate that 22% of killings
fall into this category. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death
Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 713 (1990-1991).
195. In a study of all homicides in Philadelphia between 1948 and 1952, the investigator found that
the homicides were almost evenly divided between non-violent (a single blow or shot) and violent (more
than one blow, shot, or stab). WOLFGANG, supra note 47, at 156-64. While not all multiple-act
homicides would qualify as heinous, the data at least suggest that such killings are not infrequent.
196. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, tbl. 3.134 at 382.
197. In Georgia and Florida, which have broad heinousness standards, killings involving weapons
other than guns were between 1.7 and 1.95 times more likely to result in a death sentence than killings
with guns. In Illinois, which restricts heinousness to victims under 12, there was no difference in the
death sentence rate in terms of whether the killing was with a gun or with another weapon. SAMUEL R.
GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION tbl. 4.13 at 52 (1989).
198. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, tbl. 3.139 at 386. Because some 38% of the
reported cases classify the relationship between victim and assailant as "unknown," it is a fair estimate
that the actual percentage of killings involving strangers is higher than the 15% reported in the text.
199. Some empirical studies of individual states demonstrate the difficulty of making exact estimates
with respect to these matters. These results also demonstrate the wide differences that flow from judicial
treatment of certain aggravating circumstances.
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national figures lump manslaughter with murder. But at an absolute minimum,
one can see that the Code's menu of aggravating circumstances applies to a
significant percentage of non-negligent, criminal homicides.
For states that employ a more narrow set of aggravating circumstances than
the Code, about one in five persons convicted of a non-negligent homicide is
death eligible, and about two in five convicted of murder are death eligi-
ble.20 Thus, in these states, some 60% of those who would have been
eligible for the death penalty before Furman are no longer in that category
because a required aggravating circumstance is not present. At the other
extreme, in states with expansive death penalty statutes modeled on the Model
Penal Code, there may be little narrowing. In the most comprehensive
published study of the operation of the new law in a given state, Baldus and
his co-investigators estimate that for the period between 1974 and 1979, 86%
of the 767 people convicted of murder in Georgia were death eligible under
that state's broad death penalty statute.21
Murders involving a contemporaneous felony and murders involving
"heinousness" are the two most frequently charged aggravated murders. Thus
in New Jersey, out of 246 death eligible cases between 1983 and 1991, 157
involved a felony circumstance and 81 involved vile and heinous behavior. Of
those sentenced to death, more than half involved a finding of heinousness,
or felony circumstance, or both.20 2 In Georgia, more than half of all murders
Baldus and his associates found that out of 606 death eligible cases, 96 or 16% provided a basis for
the "endangering others" circumstance, and 212 or 35% provided a basis for Georgia's broad pecuniary
motive circumstance. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150, at 89. In New Jersey, 17% of the death eligible
cases involved the "grave risk" circumstance but only 2% involved the narrowly defined pecuniary
circumstance factor. DAVID C. BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECr, FINAL
REPORT FOR THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT thls. I & 10 (1991) [hereinafter BALDUS, PROPORTION-
ALrrY REvjEw].
Paternoster, reviewing South Carolina homicides from 1977 to 1981, identified 311 death-eligible
cases. Of these, less than 2% (5) involved murder for pecuniary gain and none involved a "grave risk"
to two or more persons in public. Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the
Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Discrimination, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 437, 446 (1984). In
Pennsylvania, a study of 1174 first-degree murder convictions from 1978 through 1989 revealed that
prosecutors alleged the existence of an aggravating circumstance in 856 cases. Of these, 150 (13% of
all cases) involved the circumstance of knowingly creating a grave risk to a person other than the victim
and 53 (4.5% of all cases) involved either paying another to kill or receiving pay to kill. John F. Karns
& Lee S. Weinberg, The Death Sentence in Pennsylvania 1978-1990, DICK. L. REV. 691, 719 (1991).
200. Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
754, 765 (1983). Paternoster concluded that 321 out of 1686 individuals charged with non-negligent
homicides committed in South Carolina from June 1977 through the end of December 1981, or 19%,
were death eligible under South Carolina's narrowly drawn death statute. Id.
Pierce and Radelet, using FBI data, approximate that about 22% of all non-negligent homicides are
death eligible. They arrive at this figure by assuming that the homicides that have an accompanying
felony are death eligible and that the others are not. Pierce and Radelet, supra note 194, at 713.
Baldus and his associates found a felony circumstance in 20% of voluntary manslaughter and murder
convictions; considering murder convictions alone, the figure is 38%. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150,
at 269 n.3 1. The investigators used these figures to estimate the rough percentages of death eligibility
in states with relatively narrowly drawn capital statutes.
201. Georgia's definition of murder has remained unchanged since before Furman. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-1 (1968). Georgia uses 10 aggravating circumstances, including "outrageously or wantonly vile."
Id. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1973).
202. BALDUS Er AL., supra note 150, tis. I & 10 at 51, 92.
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involved the vileness circumstance and nearly half involved a contemporary
felony; more than 80% of all those sentenced to death had killed under one
or both of these aggravating circumstances. 20 3 In Florida, Illinois, Mississip-
pi, and Virginia, more than 70% of all death penalty cases involved a
contemp6rary felony as did two of out of three such cases in Arkansas and
North Carolina and more than one half of the cases in Oklahoma.2a In
Pennsylvania, between 1978 and 1989, an accompanying felony circumstance
was alleged in 103 of 214 cases resulting in a death sentence.2"5
Baldus concluded that "statutorily designated aggravated circumstances in
Georgia's post-Furman law do not serve in practice to distinguish murder
cases in which death sentences are routinely imposed from those that normally
result in a life sentence."20 6 Moreover, the existence of an individual
aggravating circumstance appears to contribute nothing to an increase in
consistency after Furman.0 7 More than 90% of those who received death
before Furman would have been eligible to receive death after Furman.0
On the other hand, there was an increase in the rate at which death sentences
were imposed. Fifteen percent of murderers received death before Furman,
and 19% of murderers received death after Furman. Twenty-three percent of
all death-eligible murderers received death after Furman.0 9
When one begins to aggregate aggravated circumstances, however, their
power to predict death sentences increases. 210 Moreover, when one goes
203. Id. at 89.
204. GROSS & MAURO, supra note 197, at 45, 89.
205. Kams & Weinberg, supra note 199, tbl. 13 at 699, 719. The juries actually found the
circumstance in only 82 of these cases; in the other 21, the juries found some other aggravating
circumstance that enabled them to impose a death sentence. Pennsylvania requires a finding that the
defendant intended to kill in order to support a felony murder aggravating circumstance.
206. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150, at 97.
207. The aouthors of EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY note:
Thus, if cases were matched only by statutory aggravating factors, the post-Furman system
would appear to be at least as random as the pre-Furman system viewed most favorably ....
More than half (.57) of the death sentences imposed under the revised procedures were
presumptively excessive, compared to .43 for the pre-Furman period. Perhaps even more
significantly, there would be no subcategory of cases, defined by a specific statutory
aggravating circumstance, for which the death-sentencing rate equalled our benchmark for
evenhandedness, a rate of .80.
Id. at 90.
The picture is not quite this bleak. When one begins to cumulate aggravating circumstances, the death
sentencing rate goes up proportionately from a rate of .04 when there is a single aggravating factor to
.63 when there are five or six aggravating factors. Moreover, consistency improves again if one
abandons statutory aggravating circumstances and considers 17 legitimate case characteristics which
make up the author's culpability index. Id. at 90-91. For a further discussion of consistency, see infra
note 213.
208. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150, at 102.
209. Id. at 268 n.3 1. Of the 4472 Georgia murders and non-negligent manslaughters reported to the
FBI between 1974 and 1979, 17% resulted in murder convictions. Of these 17%, 86% were eligible for
death under the Georgia statute. Forty-five percent of both the reported murders and voluntary
manslaughters resulted in convictions, and of these, 65% were death eligible under post-Furman Georgia
law. Id.
210. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150 at 89; GROSS & MAURO, supra note 197, tbls. 4.22 & 5.2 at
60, 90 (demonstrating this relationship in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Oklahoma, North Carolina,
Mississippi, and Arkansas); Kams & Weinberg, supra note 197, at 721.
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beyond the lawfully designated aggravating circumstances and considers
legitimate,"' extra-legal factors, the level of consistency increases even more
significantly." 2 Thus, the most comprehensive before and after study of the
impact of the new law concluded that, when one combined statutory and
non-statutory legitimate factors, the consistency with which death was
imposed did increase after Furman. 
3
When one looks beyond the listed aggravating circumstances, a sentencer's
confidence that the defendant deliberately chose to take a life plays an
important role in terms of the ultimate disposition of the case. However
logical the intellectual argument against premeditation and deliberation, those
who actually make the decisions about life or death care a good deal about the
principle that conscious and deliberate killings are the most blameworthy.214
Who the victim is, whether a prior relationship existed with the killer, and
Nakell and Hardy examined some 600 homicides resulting in arrests in North Carolina for the period
June 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978. Out ofthese cases, eight individuals were sentenced to death, with
one individual receiving two death sentences. Nakell and Hardy created a weighted scale for aggravating
circumstances. NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 182, at 107. Using this variable, they found the level of
aggravating circumstances to be statistically significant at the indictment stage and at the stage of
deciding whether to put the individual on trial for first-degree murder. But it was not significant at the
stages when the case was submitted to the jury, when the jury convicted the defendant, or when the jury
returned a death sentence. Id. at 120-49.
211. As opposed to such illegal and therefore illegitimate factors as race of the defendant or race of
the victim.
212. For instance, Barnett identifies three factors which, when present together, produce a death
sentence in 81% of the cases: (1) the certainty that the defendant is a deliberate killer;, (2) the status of
the victim (for example, the victim is a total stranger or acting in her official capacity when slain); and
(3) the "heinousness" of the killing. Barnett, supra note 178, at 1339-45. The next category down in
terms of the overall score on these variables led to death sentences in about 25% of the cases. This
prompted Barnett to suggest:
Suppose, for argument's sake, that all Category 3 death sentences in Georgia were vacated. If
our classification scheme makes sense, this act alone might greatly reduce the arbitrary element
in the Georgia death sentencing.... Yet, Georgia would still have ... something like eight
executions per year. Georgia might be able to satisfy the requirements for proportionality
review, therefore, without coming anywhere close to abolishing capital punishment.
Id. at 1353 (emphasis in original).
213. BALDus ET AL., supra note 150, at 97. Consistency is measured in two ways. First, the authors
describe the cases in which life is normally the result and then look to see the extent to which the cases
in which death is imposed overlap with these cases. This measures the extent to which death cases are
in fact distinguishable from life cases. By this measure, some 61% of pre-Furman death cases
overlapped with the normal range of life cases as contrasted to 29% post-Furman. Id. figs. 4 & 5 at 83,
91. Moreover, when one divides cases according to those in which death is imposed in fewer than 35
out of 100 instances and those in which death is imposed in 80 out of 100 instances, a considerably
higher percentage of post-Furman cases were in the group in which death is consistently imposed. Id.
tbIs. 5 & 10 at 85, 92. As noted, if one simply employed the statutory aggravating circumstances to
measure post-Furman consistency, then there is a decrease in consistency between the pre-1972 and
post-1972 cases. Id. tbls. 5 & 9 at 85, 90.
214. BALDUS, PROPORTIONALrrY REviEw, supra note 199, at 72; NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 182,
at 147 (stating that the degree of culpability of first-degree murder is one of two-prior record being
the other-statistically significant factors in explaining the probability of a death sentence as the pool
is reduced from homicide arrests representing 489 defendant-victim units to eight death sentences);
Barnett, supra note 178, at 1339-40. For experimental evidence confirming that deliberate killers are
seen as more blameworthy than other participants in a felony murder, see Norman J. Finkel, Capital
Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 819, 848 (1990).
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whether the victim is a woman or a child are also relevant factors.2t 5 Where
the crime occurs also matters; even within states, substantial disparities exist
in terms of the rate at which murders are prosecuted as capital and in the
resulting rate of death sentences.1 6
While there may be an increase in the consistency with which death is
imposed in cases involving a particular constellation of circumstances, this
increase cannot be attributed to the existence of a new class of capital murder.
Simply put, no evidence shows that the existence of a single aggravating
circumstance guarantees that death will be applied more consistently than it
was applied in murder convictions before 1972. Because a cumulation of
aggravating circumstances helps predict which cases will end in death
sentences, it appears that if aggravating circumstances play a role, it is as a
guide to the exercise of discretion. However, no state has embraced the logic
of these findings by requiring more than a single aggravating circumstance as
a condition of death eligibility or by amending its capital sentencing statute
to recognize the powerful effects the status of the victim and the deliberate-
ness of the defendant's act have on sentencers.1 7
215. Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro have found that stranger killings result in a death sentence at
a considerably higher rate than non-stranger killings in every state they studied: Georgia, Florida,
Illinois, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Mississippi, Virginia, and Arkansas. GRoss & MAURO, supra note
197, at 48, 235-45. They also report this same relationship when the victim is a woman. Id. at 52,
235-45. Baldus and associates, in constructing their culpability scale for Georgia, identified 18 relevant
factors, six of which dealt with victim status: stranger, female, hostage, police or firefighter, child
younger than 12, and low status. Of these, only one-police and fire status-is a statutory aggravating
circumstance. David C. Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing
Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1375, 1396 (1985); Barnett, supra note 178,
at 1338-45 (discussing the importance of the lack of prior social relationship between victim and
defendant).
216. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 150, at 244-46.
217. Justice Stevens argued for this kind of approach in his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987), a case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia death penalty scheme
even assuming that it had been demonstrated statistically that the race of the victim played a key role
in the imposition of death:
The Court's decision appears to be based on a fear that the acceptance of McCleskey's claim
would sound the death knell for capital punishment in Georgia. If society were indeed forced
to choose between a racially discriminatory death penalty (one that provides heightened
protection against murder "for whites only") and no death penalty at all, the choice mandated
by the Constitution would be plain. [Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)]. But the
Court's fear is unfounded. One of the lessons of the Baldus study is that there exist certain
categories of extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek; and juries
consistently impose, the death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the race of
the offender. If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to those
categories, the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would
be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.
Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens was referring to statistics presented
by Professor David Baldus which showed that in the most serious category of cases (those with the
highest number of aggravating circumstances), juries imposed death in 88% of all cases presented to
them. Id. at 325 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell rejected Justice Stevens' proposal in a footnote on two
grounds: (1) any reategorizhtion of death eligibility would still create a borderline area in which the
difference between those who received death and those who did not would be difficult to explain; and
(2) even if a new category could be created, a prosecutor would have difficulty in applying it on a case-
by-case basis. Id. at 318 n.45. It is difficult to know what to make of the second point because it appears
to be based on a rejection of the core factual premise-that there is an identifiable subset of aggravated
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B. Narrowing in Pursuit of Equality
While the ostensible role of the new law was to ameliorate arbitrariness, the
effort to declare the death penalty unconstitutional was driven by those
concerned about the racially discriminatory impact of capital punishment.28
This issue remains a central concern. 2' 9 There have been many empirical
investigations of the issue, the vast majority of which show that discrimina-
tion based on the victim's race persists. Those who kill white people receive
death at a greater rate than those who kill minorities. 2" No investigator
challenges this basic finding. To the extent there is a dispute, it relates to
whether legitimate, non-racial factors explain the disparity. Statutorily defined
aggravating circumstances are, of course, the most legitimate of these factors.
These circumstances virtually always include felony murder.22" '
Between 1976 and 1989, 6% of all murders involved African American
defendants and white victims, while 18% of felony murders involved African
American defendants and white victims. For the most common felonies that
constitute an aggravating circumstance-rape, robbery, and burglary-the
figures were 18.4%, 27.4%, and 19.9%, respectively. In other words, if no
felony circumstance accompanied the murder, only 4% of all murders and
non-negligent homicides nationally involved an African American defendant
and a white victim.222 Because felony murder is the quintessential aggravat-
ed homicide and because it is also the murder most likely to involve African
American perpetrators and white victims, 223 the prominence of white victims
in capital cases is not surprising. Indeed, the law of aggravating circumstances
encourages applying the death sentence to those who kill whites.224
cases in which death is consistently applied-which forms the basis of Justice Stevens' proposal.
218. MELTSNER, supra note 65, at 36.
219. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
220. For a recent review of the literature and a report of a study concluding that this phenomenon
is at work in Texas as well, consult Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 182, at 751-56, 775.
221. The Supreme Court in Enmund indicated that of the 36 states then authorizing capital
punishment, only four completely excluded felony murder as a capital crime. Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 789 n.6 (1982).
222. Table 3.143 of The 1992 Bureau of Justice Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics indicates
that for 1991, with respect to homicides known to the police, 47% of all homicide victims were white
and 50% were African American. Table 3.152 indicates that, with respect to homicides involving a
single offender and a single victim, the 4838 white offenders killed 4399 white victims and 347 African
American victims. The 5778 African American offenders killed 691 white victims and 5035 African
American victims. Thus, about 12% of all murders and non-negligent homicides committed by African
Americans involved a white victim whereas 7% of all murders and non-negligent homicides by whites
involved an African American victim. SHR, supra note 194.
223. Rosen, Felony Murder, supra note 10, at 1117-20.
224. Rosen notes, "[Tihe [felony murder] rule does allow a large, racially skewed group of
defendants whose culpability has not been examined individually to be convicted of first degree murder,
and thus to be potentially eligible for the death penalty." ld. at 1120.
In their concurring and dissenting opinions in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903, 915 (1993),
Justices Thomas and Stevens offered differing visions of the racial impact of giving jurors discretion
in deciding whether to impose death. While the issue in Graham dealt with mitigating circumstanc-
es-specifically, whether the former Texas capital statute gave the sentencer the opportunity to give full
play to mitigating circumstances such as youth and unfortunate background-Justice Thomas intimated
support for a mandatory capital sentencing scheme as an antidote to the possibilities for racism inherent
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If the new law of homicide is in fact in the business of driving racial
discrimination from the institution of capital punishment, it appears to have
had some rather surprising effects. While comparing those who were executed
before 1957 with those who are on death row today may be equivalent to
comparing oranges and tangerines, it gives some sense of how the problem
has shifted in the last twenty years. Sellin's figures showed that between 1930
and 1957, more whites than African Americans had been executed in the
Northeast (408 whites, 160 African Americans), the North Central (236
whites, 126 African Americans), and the West (436 whites, 347 African
Americans). No state outside of the South executed more African Americans
than whites. In the South, 1158 African Americans had been executed,
compared with 540 whites. Of the seventeen Southern states, only the border
states of West Virginia, Kentucky, and Oklahoma had executed more whites
than blacks.
If one looks at those under sentence of death as of April 20, 1993, one sees
a -different picture: African Americans now outnumber whites on death row
in only eight states. These states are:
PRISONERS UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH
225
STATE AFRICAN AMERICAN WHITE
Illinois 94 49
Pennsylvania 92 55
Ohio 65 57
Mississippi 31 21
Louisiana 26 13
Maryland 11 3
New Jersey 4 3
Delaware 8 3
In the three northern states with the largest death row population (Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio), African Americans outnumber whites by a margin
of 3 to 2. While suggesting causality undoubtedly pushes the data beyond
what it can comfortably support, it is worth observing that each of these states
includes felony murder and excludes "heinousness" from its list of aggravated
circumstances. 226 The same is true of Maryland.
Looking at the statistics from the other perspective-whether the- racial
composition of death row varies according to whether the jurisdiction employs
felony murder alone or both felony murder and heinousness-one comes to
in any sentencing discretion. Id. at 903 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens disagreed, but identified
the "heinousness" aggravating circumstance as the one most likely to pose the danger that racial
discrimination might infect the sentencing decision. Id. at 916 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Both Justices
focused on the possible application of a standard rather than on the perpetrator-victim mix inherent in
the aggravating circumstance. That is, they looked for racial effects as external to rather than inherent
in the formal structure of capital murder law.
225. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, tbl. 6.126 at 670.
226. Illinois limits heinousness to murders of children under the age of 12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 9-1(b)(7) (1992).
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the same conclusion. As of April 1991, 1243 white and 966 African American
prisoners were on the nation's death rows. If one limited the inquiry to only
those fourteen states that did not embrace "heinousness" as an aggravating
circumstance, there were almost the same number of African Americans (501)
as whites (527).227 The states that embraced heinousness as a criterion had
more than one and one-half white prisoners on death row for every one
African American prisoner.228 While these figures do not prove that a
doctrine focusing upon who is killed (for example, felony murder) tends to
select African American defendants, they are certainly not inconsistent with
that view. What they do contradict is the easy assumption that the more
open-ended "heinousness" aggravating circumstance presents the most fertile
breeding ground for racially motivated death decisions.229
At a minimum, there is no basis in any study to date or in the figures
presented above for believing that the law of aggravating circumstances by
itself eliminates or even successfully addresses the issue of racial inequality,
which prompted the initial change in the law. To the extent that capital
punishment is employed in a race-neutral manner, it is the consciousness with
which prosecutors in the South as opposed to the North approach their
charging decisions which probably makes the difference.23 If any legislation
explains the difference in the racial composition of death row in the South,
the most likely candidate is the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and not the new
law of aggravated murder. After Furman, the death sentence has been imposed
with more consistency, but this consistency does not seem to result from the
law's identification of the death eligible, at least in those states with broad
death eligibility statutes. Racial discrimination based on the identity of the
defendant has apparently decreased, but taking the life of a white person
remains a more serious offense than taking the life of a non-white person.
Finally, narrowly drawn statutes (for example, those relying primarily on
227. The states which do not have an operative "heinousness" provision are Arkansas, California,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. Other explanations are more than possible. This list includes five of the
six most populous states in the country that embrace capital punishment, and includes the six largest
urban areas in which capital punishment is present: Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco,
Houston, and Dallas.
228. In Wolfgang's study of Philadelphia homicides during the years 1948-1952, he reported that
the closeness of the relationship between victim and defendant seemed to have no relationship to the
level of violence involved in the killing. However, if one limited the inquiry to spousal killings, there
was a significant relationship: 44 out of the 53 men who killed their wives did so in a violent manner
(for all homicides, about half were classified as violent and half as non-violent). WOLFGANG, supra note
47, at 209-14. Because spousal killings tend to be intraracial killings, the menu of aggravating
circumstances may well have a race-specific effect on the population of death row.
229. A Pennsylvania study noted that the racial disparity in death sentences based on the race of the
victim and the race of the offender grew more pronounced, rather than less so, once one looked only
at those cases involving a felony circumstance. Kams & Weinberg, supra note 199, at 724. Pennsylvania
also lists torture as an aggravating circumstance. While more narrowly defined than "heinousness" and
therefore not directly relevant to the argument in the text, it is worth noting that, with respect to this
aggravating circumstance, the race of the victim and offender made no difference except that whites who
tortured non-whites to death were sentenced to death at a higher rate than any other group. Id. at 729.
230. Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95
HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981).
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felony murder) may even have the perverse effect of increasing the relative
percentage of African Americans who actually face execution. Indeed, no
evidence suggests that any gains in consistency that can be attributed to the
new approach are a result of "narrowing" through aggravated circumstances
rather than giving the jury standards to guide its decision as to death.
C. The New Law as Doctrine
The commentary to the draft of the Model Penal Code asserted that capital
punishment had a "discernible and baneful effect on the administration of
criminal justice." '231 The point holds true today. While the commentary drew
attention to the effect of trials and executions, today the effect extends to the
law itself.
The new law emphasizes behavioral as opposed to psychological criteria for
imposing death. This emphasis defeats any effort to articulate a theory of why
it is appropriate to kill some murderers and not others. To the extent that a
unifying theme exists, it appears to be that society renders subject to
execution those whose conduct proves most frightening to the potential
sentencers. 2 2 This criterion invites rather than diminishes the very
subjectivity and inconsistency which plagued the earlier law. Moreover, this
test-translated into specific aggravating circumstances-virtually assures that
the race of the victim will be a powerful and prominent determinant of who
is prosecuted, convicted, and executed. Felony murder no longer stands as an
exception to the general rule of criminal responsibility based on conscious
choice to take life. Now, it is the paradigm of such responsibility, the worst
crime in our lexicon.
The new approach theoretically serves the values of predictability and
consistency. The categories are clear and understandable. Yet few who are not
students of capital punishment could identify the factors that make one death
eligible. Typically they are kept off-stage, away from the definition of murder,
in lists of varying lengths in special sections of the codes devoted to capital
punishment. The placement-indeed, the entire procedural thicket that has
grown up around aggravating circumstances-has symbolic as well as
practical importance. It reflects the abandonment of any notion that the death
penalty can, will, or even should influence behavior. The surrender of any
231. Model Penal Code § 201.6 cmt. 1.
232. Barnett makes this point in connection with the role of the victim's status in determining the
likelihood of a death sentence.
This status dimension has little explicit basis in the law. It is hard to avoid speculating that,
in killings in which jurors can imagine themselves or their loved ones as victims, death
penalties are more likely to be imposed. To say this is not to impute cynicism to the juries;
when a case evokes genuine fear, considerations of deterrence may more greatly affect the
sentencing decision than otherwise.
Barnett, supra note 178, at 1341.
Steven G. Gey argues that jurors are frightened because of the defendant's apparent incorrigibility.
Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 116 (1992). This suggests
that death is imposed for incapacitation or retributive reasons, not deterrent ones.
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serious belief that the purpose of capital punishment is to prevent crime is
deeply troubling. It suggests that, at bottom, the system is about processing
criminals rather than controlling crime.
The new law presents the problem of over- and under-inclusiveness that
characterized the prior law. Now, however, instead of exempting the
impulsive or irrational killer, the law exempts the calculated and efficient
killer. It is difficult to see this development as salutary; it suggests that it is
worse to participate in a felony in which a co-felon unexpectedly kills a third
party than it is to plan and execute a murder in a non-felony setting. These
priorities are worse than strange; they undercut the basic understanding of
moral seriousness reflected in the criminal law. And they do so in the
misguided service of regularizing the application of the death penalty.
While some have argued for the retention of capital punishment on
retributive grounds,2 33 no one suggests that the current collection of
aggravating circumstances represents the killings that a rational retributivist
would deem (a) morally equivalent and (b) worse than all other killings. The
lack of effort does not surprise; it is difficult to articulate a theory of moral
seriousness that makes no distinction between those who desire to bring about
a particular forbidden result and those who do not. Yet this is precisely the
law with respect to a large number of aggravating circumstances in a variety
of states.
The problem extends beyond judicial reluctance to require a finding of mens
rea with respect to specific aggravating circumstances. There is not even
agreement that capital murder requires either the purpose or the willingness
to kill. In certain states the felony-murder rule operates in a manner that
permits the execution of those who did not intend to kill and did not
themselves kill.234 Thus, twenty years after Furman it is legitimate for a
state to have a law of murder that does not require the purpose or knowledge
to kill combined with a law of aggravating circumstances that also has no
such requirement.
Some have suggested that retribution does not require even-handedness as
long as those who are executed morally deserve death.235 Whatever the force
of this argument when applied to a decision to take a given individual's life,
it does not justify a law which does not classify equivalent cases similarly.
The capital punishment process at its most bloody still executes but a tiny
fraction of all who kill. No coherent theory of moral desert holds that it does
not matter whether we attempt to select morally equivalent cases.236
The failure to distinguish between those who intend to take life and those
who do not, or between those who intend to inflict gratuitous suffering and
233. EARNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 219-20 (1975).
234. Rosen, Felony Murder, supra note 10, at 1126 n.62.
235. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 233, at 219-21.
236. "[W]e also limit punishments in order to maintain a scale for different offenses which reflect,
albeit very roughly, the distinction felt between the moral gravity of these offenses. Thus we make some
approximation to the ideal of justice of treating morally like cases alike and morally different ones
differently." Hart, supra note 36, at 453.
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those who do not, or between those who kill in order to further a felony and
those who do not, creates a difficulty which extends well beyond lack of
theoretical congruence. The distinctions between intent, recklessness,
negligence, and pure accident permeate the criminal law. They are the primary
criteria by which society grades offenses. For any given prohibited result, if
society makes a distinction at all (as invariably it does when the result is
serious) it always treats the person whose purpose was to produce that result
as the most serious offender.237 Perhaps the main reason for this is that
choice underlies any theory of desert. Utilitarian considerations also play a
role. One should have the greatest control over what one does purposely, and
signalling that the most severe punishment awaits those who purposely violate
the law should discourage such conduct. Whatever the reason, grading by
intentionality provides the structure of the criminal law of the United States.
Ignoring it robs the criminal law of any self-limiting principle.
The ready answer to these objections is that the new law is designed to
achieve consistency and evenhandedness, not deterrence or retribution. While
all may agree to the moral and utilitarian relevance of grading offenses in
terms of the gap between the ends sought and the means employed or
according to the level of pleasure a killer derives from the act, employing
such criteria might lead to inconsistent results. Therefore, some believe it is
better to exclude explicit inquiry into motive or pleasure or other psychologi-
cal refinements 238 and instead to concentrate on more measurable criteria.
This is precisely the problem. The most serious crime-capital murder-has
lost any legitimate purpose. Instead, its purpose seems to be to achieve the
"foolish consistency" which, Emerson reminded us, is the "hobgoblin of little
minds."2"'
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that a society that will not employ capital punishment
is one that has lost confidence in its judgment and principles. 240 However
one evaluates that claim, it does suggest the pre-eminent problem with capital
punishment today. Society has chosen rules that appear clear in favor of rules
that demand moral judgment because it lacks faith that those who participate
in the legal system are capable of making those judgments in a consistent and
237. Sometimes the law treats recklessness or gross recklessness as severely as it treats intentional
conduct. However, it never defines a result brought about recklessly as more blameworthy than the same
result brought about intentionally.
238. Some aggravating circumstances involve such principles. "Heinousness" does whenever it is
interpreted to require that the defendant desire that the victim suffer before dying. A pecuniary motive
is frequently identified as an aggravating factor. However, with the possible exception of Idaho, State
v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463 (Idaho 1983), no state employs an aggravating circumstance which would allow
the jury to evaluate motive or to weigh ends and means so as to sentence to death those who kill on no
provocation, or because the person suddenly switches traffic lanes, or in order to establish their bona
fides as a "made" man.
239. Ralph Waldo Emerson, SpiritualLaws, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
(Joseph Slater et al. eds., 1979).
240. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 233, at 213.
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non-discriminatory fashion. Society has chosen rules that appear to regularize
decisions in favor of rules designed to control conduct because it has lost
faith that potential criminals will conform their conduct to the law. Criminals
have become the "other," beyond our capacity to influence. Finally, society
has chosen rules that mask rather than reveal vital criteria underlying capital
decisions-the status of the victim, the race of the victim, and the location of
the crime. Whether as a symptom or a cause, the "baneful" influence of the
institution of capital punishment on the criminal justice system remains
unchecked.

